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WHY THE CLEAN AIR ACT WORKS BADLY
WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN, JR.t
As the Clean Air Act,' perhaps the nation's most important,
and certainly its most controversial, environmental regulatory stat-
ute, approaches its scheduled reauthorization by the 97th Congress,
2
major amendments seem increasingly likely. Economic concerns, a
general anti-regulatory mood, and, above all, the election in 1980
of a more conservative President and Congress all suggest that result.
In addition, many supporters of strong environmental protection
would agree that the statute's current structure is too cumbersome,
and is poorly suited to address several of the emerging issues in air
pollution control.
3
f Deputy General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency. B.A. 1965, LL.B.
1968, Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author only and not necessarily those of the Environmental Protection Agency or
of any other employee of the Environmental Protection Agency.
1 The Clean Air Act in its original form was enacted as the Clean Air Act of
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). It has since been amended several
times: Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965); Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954
(1966); Pub. L. No. 90-148, 80 Stat. 485 (1967); Pub. L. No. 91-137, 83 Stat.
283 (1969); Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85
Stat. 464 (1971); Pub. L. No. 93-15, 87 Stat. 11 (1973); Pub. L. No. 93-319,
88 Stat. 248, 261, 265 (1974); Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), and Pub.
L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1399 (1977). By far the most important of these enact-
ments are the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970), which gave the statute its present form, and the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), which extensively altered
the details of the structure that the 1970 amendments established. The Clean
Air Act as amended is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supps. II 1978 & Ill
1979).
2The statute's authorization for appropriations expires in October 1981 and
must be legislatively extended. 42 U.S.C. § 7626 (Supp. III 1979). The difficult
nature of the issues and the relatively slow startup in legislative activity to be
expected from the change in the leadership of both the executive branch and the
Senate as a result of the 1980 election, however, will probably delay final action
until at least the end of the 97th Congress. The authorization for appropriations
in the 1970 version of the statute expired in mid-1973, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1705, 1709, but the statute itself was not fully rewritten until 1977.
3 See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean
Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1566 (1980) ("The [Clean Air] Act discarded the
idea that policymaking should be insulated from direct congressional intervention.
But instead of providing a solution responsive to the evolving will of a national
majority, congressional intervention mixed clean air symbols and dirty coal self-
interest in a way that invites cynicism about democratic self-government.");
Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, 78 MicH. L. REv. 155, 201 (1979) ("The bewildering menagerie of
[variance] provisions in the 1977 Act promises to be a rich source of expensive
and time-consuming litigation. . . . [T]hey provide only temporary symptomatic
relief for the continuing malady of statutory inflexibility. . . . It is tempting to
say that Congress has failed to learn from its mistakes."); Currie, Nondegradation
and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CaE'. L. REv. 48, 82 (1980) ("[Tlhe
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This article describes some of the statute's more serious defects,
and offers one possible cure for them. It begins by identifying three
basic objectives for the Clean Air Act (the Act). First, the regula-
tory system created by the statute should readily incorporate new
knowledge as it arises. Our understanding of pollution is too
limited and too rapidly evolving to allow the statute to be built
directly on today's hypotheses. Second, this system should control
pollution in the most economically efficient manner. Finally, the
mechanical, legal, and procedural workings of the control scheme
should strive towards simplicity and consistency.
Each of these three goals places its own distinct demands on
the regulatory framework required by the statute. All three de-
mands, however, raise the central question of how to handle regula-
tory change. First, and most fundamentally, new knowledge regard-
ing the causes and effects of pollution, or the cost and availability
of controls, may suggest amendments to regulatory requirements.
Second, regulated sources or pollution control agencies may seek
these changes to meet existing requirements in a more efficient way.
Finally, frequent minor and mechanical revisions will be necessary
to the smooth functioning of the air pollution control effort, as they
are to the operation of any complicated regulatory structure.
At present, the Act fails to deal acceptably with any of these
issues. Under it, new scientific and technical knowledge always
can-and frequently must-result in immediate changes in the cor-
responding regulatory requirements. The new requirements must
then take effect within tight and somewhat arbitrary deadlines.
The result is a control effort notably lacking in certainty or
predictability.
One might think that a statute that demands such constant
changes would at least avoid procedural obstacles to change. In
fact, however, affirmative action at two levels of government-one
state, one federal-is generally required to amend rules under the
Act. This "double-key" requirement has offered few real benefits
to offset its obvious procedural burdens.
These two characteristics of the present system combine to work
against the attainment of any of the three goals suggested above.
The unscheduled and unpredictable character of the regulatory
changes that new knowledge can require has fostered a tendency to
resist new knowledge. At the same time, the lengthy double-key
approval process hampers both changes that are designed to meet
complex implementing provisions [for the Clean Air Act's 'prevention of significant
deterioration' requirements] present both serious difficulties of interpretation and
questionable policy choices.").
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present requirements in a more efficient way and housekeeping or
mechanical changes.
This article argues that all these defects could be alleviated by
statutory amendments that would shift the regulatory scheme toward
greater reliance on fixed-term, source-specific, state-issued permits
to regulate pollution sources. Changes to these permits resulting
from new knowledge or new policy choices would generally be made
only when they expired and were reissued. That would give such
changes predictability and would thus make them easier to accept.
This article also suggests that changes to meet existing requirements
more efficiently, and housekeeping changes, should, by contrast, be
freely available. In addition, all types of changes should be made
procedurally easier by dropping the double-key requirement of
affirmative approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA
or Agency). Instead, state-issued permits should take effect auto-
matically unless the EPA objects to them within a specified, brief
period.
I. GoALs FOR THE CLEAN AiR Acr
The Clean Air Act provides separate regulatory frameworks
for different types of pollution "sources." Title I of the Act deals
principally with controls on "stationary sources" of air pollution,
such as factories and power plants, while title II focuses on "mo-
bile sources," such as motor vehicles and aircraft.4 Title I imposes
a complex and variable set of requirements on stationary sources.
These requirements are largely contained in state implementation
plans (SIPs), which are comprehensive pollution control programs
442 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7574 (Supp. 11 1979). This article does not discuss
title H provisions. In brief summary, they authorize the EPA to impose emission
limits on "motor vehicles" (trucks, busses, automobiles, and motorcycles) generally,
id. §7521(a)(1), and on aircraft, id. §7571. In many cases, particularly where
automobiles are concerned, the title prescribes in elaborate detail either the level
of the standards or the factors to be considered in setting them, and the procedures
both for establishing these standards and for granting some temporary relief from
their provisions. See, e.g., id. §§7521(a)(3), (a)(5), (b).
Title II also prescribes measures to ensure that vehicles actually meet these
standards, such as testing and "certification" of prototypes before mass production
begins, id. § 7525(a), testing of production vehicles just off the assembly line, id.
§7525(b), and testing of cars in actual use, id. §§7541(b), (c). The manufac-
turer must warrant in several ways the ability of each in-use vehicle to meet the
standard, and in particular must warrant that it will pass an in-use test if it has
been "properly maintained and used," id. §§ 7541(a), (b).
Title H also allows the EPA to control "additives" to motor fuel (for example,
lead in gasoline), to eliminate both those that might damage a vehicle's emission
control system, id. § 7545(c) (1) (B), and those that might harm the public health
directly, id. §7545(c)(1) (A). For a more detailed description of title II, see
Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm L. 11m%
811 (1979).
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established by each state subject to EPA approval. In addition,
state-issued permits and national control standards supplement the
SIP requirements of title I.
This article focuses on some procedural shortcomings of
title I, and on a possible cure for these defects. Any analysis of
procedure, however, requires some appreciation of the substantive
nature of the field involved, and of the policy problems that arise
there-problems that the statutory procedures should help to deal
with or to answer. Although any short discussion of these issues
must inevitably be somewhat personal, I believe three major goals
for the Act have by now won general acceptance.
A. Developing New Knowledge
Regulatory agencies were originally created largely to accumu-
late expert knowledge in a field, update that knowledge, and apply
it in a flexible manner to reach specified goals.5 Although this
model of the agency has been criticized for treating questions that
involve policy or political judgments as purely technical problems,
an agency that abandons the model entirely is unlikely to reach
rational results. This is particularly true in the environmental
field, where problems are intricate and knowledge is incomplete
and evolving. In this area at least, though it may not be possible
to say that an answer is "right" on strictly technical grounds, be-
cause policy considerations must also be consulted, it is certainly
possible to be wrong for strictly technical reasons. Case studies in
environmental regulation have shown how often bad decisions are
linked to a lack of knowledge.1
5 See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1471 n.10 (citing J. FREEDMAN,
CRIsis AND LEGIIMAY 32-33, 44-46, 59-60 (1978)); Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1667, 1676-81 (1975). Cf.
J. LANDIs, Tim ADmINISTRATRVE PROCESS 23-24, 68-70 (1938).
6 Stewart, supra note 5, at 1682-88, 1702, 1712-15.
7 See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1483, 1517, 1522, 1523-24,
1526-32, 1534-35, 1554-55 (decision on sulfur standards for coal-fired power plants
made with imperfect knowledge of the effects of emitted sulfur compounds on
'health, visibility range, or acid rain; of the dispersion and transformation of sulfur
compounds in the atmosphere; of reliability of different types of emission-reducing
"scrubbers"; of the merits and drawbacks of "coal washing" as an alternative to
"scrubbing," and of the variation in energy and sulfur content of various coal
supplies). See also B. ACKERmAN, S. ROsE-AcKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON,
THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVMONMENTAL QUALrrY (1974) (decisions on
effluent standards for the Delaware River made with imperfect knowledge of how
oxygen-demanding wastes naturally disperse and are neutralized; of the possible
adverse effects on the river of reducing the level of these wastes in the absence of
other clean-up measures, and of the favorable impact (if any) of such a step on
the fish in the river) [hereinafter cited as B. ACKERmAN].
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Pollution control requirements, generally speaking, stem either
from "ambient" calculations or from a "technology-based" standard.
Under a ambient approach, the regulatory agency sets a desired
level of air or water purity, and then computes and imposes the
pollution reductions it estimates are necessary to achieve that goal.
Under a technology-based system, the agency simply requires the
"best" methods of pollution control without detailed assessments of
ambient effects.8
A technology-based approach, by taking the focus off the funda-
mental question-the proper level of air or water purity-allows
both regulators and the regulated to design a control system with-
out seriously considering the goals it should achieve. Accordingly,
as case studies have amply demonstrated, a purely technology-based
approach will control some pollution sources too much and others
too little, entirely overlook major contributors to the problem, or
control the wrong pollutants.9
Title I of the Clean Air Act, to its great credit, is designed
largely around ambient considerations. 10 Such an approach, how-
ever, though free from fundamental conceptual flaws, has serious
problems of implementation. In particular, the treatment of new
knowledge takes on added significance where ambient-based con-
trols are involved. An ambient scheme forces the development of
new knowledge about pollution by making that knowledge relevant
to the very practical task of setting emission standards. This de-
mand for new knowledge, however, constantly calls the foundations
of the approach that demands it into question. Developments
under the Act illustrate this in several ways.
Most obviously, our understanding of what constitutes an
ambient "problem" can change. For example, one air quality
standard-for ozone-has been relaxed by fifty percent since it was
set ten years ago."
sj. Bonine & T. McGarity, The Law of Environment and Pollution, at 1--53,
96-106, 11-1-155, 111-1-156 (1980) (unpublished teaching materials used at the
University of Texas and University of Oregon Law Schools).
9See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1515-36, 1543-45 (EPA "new
source performance standards" for coal-fired power plants lack any consistent en-
vironmental purpose, control new sources too much and old sources too little, rely
on the most expensive and least reliable of the major control alternatives, and
focus on sulfur oxides rather than "sulfates," which are more important); B. AcKER-
Mtr, supra note 7 (Delaware River Basin Water Pollution Control program con-
trols industrial and municipal dischargers too much, leaves overflow from combined
storm sewers completely uncontrolled, and emphasizes simple biological wastes
rather than toxic metals and chemicals).
10 See notes 36-56 infra & accompanying text
" Compare 36 Fed. Reg. 8,186 (1976) (0.08 ppm) with 44 Fed. Beg. 8,202,
8,220 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1980)) (0.12 ppm).
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More dramatically, two other standards-those for sulfur oxides
and "particulates"-face review amid widespread, but ill-docu-
mented, concerns that they may fundamentally mistake the prob-
lems at issue. Sulfur oxides are now regulated to control concen-
trations in gaseous form relatively close to emission sources. Yet
more damage may be caused when those oxides-as well as nitrogen
oxides-are transformed over time in the atmosphere into "sulfates,"
"nitrates," or "acid rain" that fall to earth hundreds or even
thousands of miles from their place of origin. 12 Similarly, the cur-
rent particulates standard applies to all pieces of airborne dust less
than approximately fifty micrometers in diameter, even though
many qualified people believe that health risks may generally result
only from the smaller particles in this range.13 These questions
will not be rapidly resolved. Their existence shows, however, that
for years to come the statute will have to reckon with incompletely
answered questions at its very foundations. If those questions
receive future answers different from the ones accepted today, sig-
nificant restructuring of the pollution control effort may result.
Even on a day-to-day level, without considering fundamental
changes in air quality standards, the ambient approach predictably
generates knowledge that challenges the foundations of the regula-
tory system. A description of the process by which actual emissions
controls are set will demonstrate this point. The task of setting
control requirements in a region so that applicable ambient stand-
ards will be attained proceeds in four stages.14
12For discussion of "sulfates" and "nitrates," see H. LANDSBERG, et al.,
ENERGY: TnE NExT TwENTY YE-uis 336-39, 34243, 363-64 (1979); NATIoNAL
Co i ussim oN Am QuAI=Y, To BREATHE CLEAN Am 2.1-70-72, 3.4-55, 3.9-6,
9, 11-15, 17-22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L CommssION]. See also
Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1515-22.
In addition, new data suggest that ozone may be atmospherically transported,
thereby causing potential air quality problems, over much greater distances than
had previously been assumed. See NAT'L ComMtsSIoN, supra, at 2.1-27, 70,
3.4-55, 3.9-, 8-10.
13 On this point, see NAT'L CoMmiSSioN, supra note 12, at 2.1-5 3.1-10-11,
3.4-59; 11 CouNcIl ON ENVrL QUAIn-Y ANN. REP. 173 (1980).
14 This approach is summarized in various EPA regulations and other publica-
tions. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.10(e), 51.12, 51.13(d)-.13(g), 51.14(c)-.14(g),
Part 51 Appendix A (1980). See also U.S.E.P.A., OFFICE OF Am QuALrrY PLANNING
AND STANDARDs, GUIDELINES ON Am QUALITY MoDLs, No. 1.2-080 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as MODELLING GUmELNEs]. See also Ohio Envt'l Council v. EPA,
593 F.2d 24, 30 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA,
572 F.2d 1150, 1160-63 (6th Cir. 1978); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 294, 297-
312 (5th Cir. 1974). For outlines of the process, both for areas that have not
attained the established standards and for those in which the standards are met
and the prevention of significant deterioration is the goal, see NAT'L CommissioN,
supra note 12, at 3.2-5 15-22, 3.5--28-32.
[Vol. 129:1059
First, actual measurements of air pollution levels throughout
the region identify where, and to what extent, existing standards
are exceeded.
Second, the regulatory agency must compile an "inventory"
of the emission sources in the area. Because, at least for some
pollutants, a source's impact on air quality as currently measured
can vary with its location, stack height, exhaust gas velocity, or the
characteristics of its emissions, information on each of these facts
should ideally be included.
Third, the agency must apply a mathematical model to predict
how the emissions from the particular sources on the inventory give
rise to the current pollution levels. Although some models are
quite simple-consisting of little more than an assumption that an
X% reduction in emissions will lead to an Xo reduction in am-
bient pollution levels-in general the trend is towards increasing
complexity. Local air quality readings, emissions data from the
inventory, and detailed meteorological data for the region are
combined with experimental measurements of the behavior of gases
in terrain similar to that of the area being modelled to mathe-
matically predict, under various control choices, ambient pollution
levels in future weather conditions.
Finally, the agency must actually set control requirements for
the sources in the inventory. In some cases the model will re-
quire a certain minimum level of control for a source. In others,
the agency will have to choose among several satisfactory patterns
of control.
Not all these steps need necessarily be followed in every case.
In some, the model will be so simple that its application is only
a formality. In others, the model and the inventory will be used
to predict air quality directly, without reference to ambient read-
ings.15 The general trend, however, is toward increased reliance
on each step of this process.
Each of these four steps is subject to continual change. New
air quality data can suggest that the ambient problems are better,
worse, or different from what previous data had suggested. Sources
can alter their emissions characteristics, or close down and be re-
moved from the inventory. New sources may open, and sources
15 So, in Mision Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128-29 (Ist Cir. 1976),
the court upheld the EPA's use of a model with an admitted wide range of error
to determine emission requirements for Puerto Rico, even though its predictions
had never been checked against actual air quality readings. The court accepted
the Agency's argument that the available air quality data was incomplete, and
that use of an uncorrected model was scientifically preferable to use of a model
checked against inadequate data.
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that were overlooked when the inventory was compiled may be
discovered. New meteorological data may change the results that
the model yields. Finally, the mathematical structure of the model
itself may shift as knowledge advances.
None of these changes or potential changes in the knowledge
needed to operate an ambient control scheme should be resisted
taken by itself. The alternative to welcoming new knowledge is
to be willfully ignorant. It is important, however, that a regulatory
statute that is so subject to change be designed to absorb and im-
plement changes in a practical, nondisruptive way. Frequently
this will require scheduling changes in a predictable manner, rather
than implementing them immediately.
Should existing knowledge suggest, however, even inconclu-
sively, that present levels of pollution are unacceptably high, seeking
further knowledge should perhaps be subordinated to taking quick
action. 16 That approach justifies the costs of hasty, disruptive, and
inefficient action by pointing either to the great extent of current
harm or the great risk of future harm. Controversy surrounds the
extent and nature of the harm now resulting from air pollution,'
7
and the question whether it justifies extreme measures must, at
least to some extent, remain a matter of judgment. Air pollution
levels, however, have declined somewhat-though not dramatically-
over the past decade, 18 and presently scheduled control measures
are projected, in most cases, either to produce further improvements
or to hold matters constant over the next ten years.19 Whatever
16 See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1530.
17See NATL CoMvmssioN, supra note 12, at 2.1--8, 4.1-5-10 (studies of
costs avoided by air pollution control range from $4.6 to $51.2 billion annually).
See also H. LArnsBERo, supra note 12, at 351, 365, 366-67.
18 See NAT'L CosinaIssxO, supra note 12, at 1.1, 3.4-1-2; 11 Coumcrr oN
EN VT'L QuAnrry ANN. REP. 146 (1980). Nitrogen oxides (up 17%) are the only
exception to an eight-year trend of decreasing national pollution emissions. Id. 170.
19 Existing pollution levels for carbon monoxide, particulates, and ozone are
projected to decrease unambiguously from current levels over the next decade, given
current control programs. NAT'L CoMMvussIoN, supra note 12, at 2.1-23-25, 3.4-
27-30, 60-61.
Atmospheric sulfur oxide concentrations above the present standards are like-
wise projected to become less frequent. Id. 2.1-23, 3.4-32, 61. Meanwhile,
total national emissions of sulfur oxides (which may cause "acid rain") are pro-
jected to remain almost constant. Id. 2.1-73, 3.9-23. Sulfur oxide emissions in
the western United States, however, will increase during this period. Id. 2.1-73.
The current air quality standard for nitrogen oxides is rarely exceeded now
and violations are projected to decrease in the future. Id. 2.1-25-26, 3.4-32-34,
3.1-61. However, total national emissions of nitrogen oxides (which also may
cause "acid rain") are projected to increase somewhat. Id. 2.1-73.
For a summary, see id. at 2.1-87-88, 4.2-9-10, 35 (assuming current control
programs, "particulate, hydrocarbon, and carbon monoxide emissions may each
decrease by approximately 30 percent or more by 1990." Sulfur dioxide emission
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one thinks of the extent and regulatory significance of air pollu-
don's current costs, these factors suggest that future costs will prob-
ably not be greater. This in turn makes an argument for haste
based solely on future effects harder to justify.20
B. Economic Efficiency
A second fundamental objective that the Act should strive to
attain is the development of an economically efficient system of
pollution control. Economists have long pointed out the inefficiency
of regulations that require all pollution sources to reduce their
emissions equally, and have argued that the same reductions could
be achieved at less cost by mechanisms that rely on individual self-
interest to shift the control burden to those who can bear it most
cheaply.21 The argument starts from the observation that the cost
of a given control level frequently will vary among plants within
an area. Accordingly, a regulation that forces all plants in a cate-
gory to "emit no more than x" often will be inefficient, since the
same results could likely be reached by allowing plant A (where
control costs are high) to emit a little more, while requiring plant B
(where control costs are low) to emit a little less. Although total
emissions will be unchanged, the cost of control will decrease, be-
cause high-cost reductions at plant A will be replaced by low-cost
reductions at plant B.
The literature describes two different ways of achieving this
result. First, emissions could be taxed at a uniform rate. Polluters
would control their emissions down to, but not beyond, the point at
which paying the tax became cheaper than further controls. Those
for whom control was cheap would therefore end up controlling
more (though not necessarily spending more) than those for whom
control was expensive, and the overall cost of the reduction would
be minimized.
22
levels will essentially remain the same and nitrogen oxides emission levels will
remain the same or slightly increase).
20 For a similar argument in the context of measures to reduce sulfur oxides
emissions, see Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 3, at 1529-35.
21A. KNEESE & C. ScuurrTZE, POLLUUno, PRUCES, Am PuBLic Poucy 1-2,
81-84 (1975); Introduction to ECONOMICS OF THE ENvmoNsumT xxxvi-xxxviii
(R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds. 1972); Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of
Pollution, in id. 11.
22A. KNEEsr & C. ScamZE, supra note 21, at 2, 87-96; Introduction, supra
note 21, at xxxviii-xl; Ruff, supra note 21, at 13-19.
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A "pollution tax" would not set any direct control require-
ments for pollution sources. Even if a pollution tax is rejected,
however, and requirements are set directly, economic efficiency
could be improved by a scheme that allowed sources to trade re-
duction obligations among themselves. In other words, plant A
would be allowed to increase its emissions if plant B agreed to re-
duce its emissions by the same amount, leaving total emissions un-
changed. If plant A had higher control costs than plant B, both
could profit in such a system if plant A paid plant B for its extra
control effort. As long as the payment from A to B was less than
A's control cost, but more than B's, both parties would be better
off, total control costs would be reduced, and total emissions would
be unchanged.
For various reasons, the "pollution rights" approach seems more
attractive for immediate use than the taxation approach.2 3 It also
appears to fit the Clean Air Act better than the other EPA statutes. 24
There, on a bureaucratic time scale, progress has been considerable.
23 See B. Acnznmu', supra note 7, at 260-81.
24 Such approaches have most often been urged for the control of air and water
pollution. Because of the way the statutes are drafted, however, a "pollution rights"
approach fits the Clean Air Act better than the EPA's water pollution control
statute, the Clean Water Act. The Clean Air Act primarily aims to reduce overall
emissions in an area enough to meet air quality standards. To the extent different
patterns of control will meet this basic goal, the statute raises no obstacle to any
approach that would allow sources to reallocate control duties through the market.
The Clean Water Act emphasizes to a much greater extent the duty of each
"point source" of water pollution to meet certain basic technical standards. See
note 115 infra. Any reallocation effort is therefore subject to the charge that it
allows sources that will discharge more pollution than originally planned to evade
their basic duty to meet the minimum technology-based level of control. In fact,
largely due to this argument, the EPA's efforts to adopt a "bubble" approach to
water pollution control have remained static for several years, while the "bubble"
approach in air pollution has moved steadily forward. Compare [Current Develop-
ments] 9 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1815, 1901 (Feb. 2, 1979) with 46 Fed. Reg.
20,554 (1981).
The solid waste disposal regulatory area is simply too new for any of the
necessary thinking and writing to have been done. The EPA's initial regulatory
effort will concentrate on such basic questions as how to classify a waste as
hazardous and how to set standards for safe disposal. Even there, the answers will
be rough-hewn at best for quite a few years. Only after these basic questions about
the degree of danger associated with wastes, and how it can be reduced, have beei?
answered in more detail will it be possible to devise market-based methods of
attaining statutory goals.
Finally, the Agency's two major "chemical control" statutes, the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976), and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (1976), focus on the control
of chemicals that may be long-lived, mobile in the environment, and highly toxic.
Economic control approaches are generally considered unsuited for dealing with
the class of problems posed by these substances-most often the question is rather
whether the social costs of a given use outweigh the benefits, and whether use
should be allowed at all.
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Through its "bubble" 25 and "offset" 26 policies, the EPA now allows
one polluter, in certain circumstances, to increase its emissions if it
can induce another polluter to reduce emissions by a corresponding
amount. Alternatively, a polluter with low marginal control costs
can reduce pollution by more than the law requires, and then save
or "bank" the rest for future sale or use.27 These are new ap-
proaches, and presently lack major importance in the daily work-
ings of the statute. Congress, however, extended the EPA's first
efforts in the field when it revised the Act in 1977,28 and bolder
steps are likely in the current political climate.
C. Procedural Simplicity and Consistency
Simplicity and consistency at the drafting level are basic tests
for any statute. For title I of the Clean Air Act, however, these
qualities derive a broader meaning from two particular aspects of
the control scheme.
First, the Act does not exclusively call on either the federal
government or the various state governments to achieve its ends.
Instead, it yokes the two in an uneasy partnership in pursuit of a
common goal. That, in turn, makes it all the more important that
the decision-making procedures mandated by the Act be free from
needless complexity.
Second, a fundamental purpose underlying the creation of the
EPA was to provide a coordinated approach to pollution wherever
it occurred. The ultimate goal was to base regulatory decisions on
what best served a wide variety of environmental goals, and not
simply on what would clean up the air or the water taken by them-
selves. The present statute contains little recognition that the EPA
25 See 44 Fed. Beg. 71,780 (1979).
2 6 See 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976), revised, 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274 (1979), revised
again, 45 Fed. Beg. 31,311 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 Appendix S (1980)).
The EPA has recently further amended these regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676,
52,741-43 (1980).
27 The EPA explicitly prohibited "banking" in its original offset ruling, see 41
Fed. Beg. 55,524, 55,526 (1976), and then reversed itself tvo years later, see 44
Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280, 3,285 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51 Appendix S
(1980)). The Agency is developing a proposed policy statement to set the terms
and conditions under which emission reductions may be "banked" and used to
meet future air pollution control requirements.
On the subject of offset-banking, see generally Comment, Emission-Offset
Banking: Accommodating Industrial Growth With Air-Quality Standards, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 937 (1980).
28 Congress explicitly adopted the EPA's "offset" approach as the governing
rule in nonattainment areas, see text accompanying notes 49 & 50 infra, pending the
development of nonattainment SIPs. See § 129(a) (1) of Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 745 (1977). States would thereafter have discretion whether or not to adopt
this approach in their SIPs.
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administers laws to control water pollution,29 solid waste pollution,
3 0
ocean dumping of pollutants, 3' and the safety of underground drink-
ing water sources,32 or that each of these other types of pollution
can affect or be affected by measures to control air pollution.
33
This problem, long obvious in the abstract, has assumed life in the
practical world through the EPA's promulgation of regulations to
control wastes disposed of on land.34 Much land disposal has oc-
curred because disposal into air or water was tightly controlled,
while land disposal was not. Now that the EPA will also restrict
land disposal, the question of what to do with these wastes becomes
more acute.33  This question cannot be answered without examining
the relative merits of various disposal alternatives, which are often
governed by different EPA statutes.
29 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the
Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
30The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-463, 94 Stat. 2055 (1980). This statute is generally called
"RCRA," from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, which amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act into its
present form.
31The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (commonly
referred to as the Ocean Dumping Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976).
32 The Safe Drinking Water Act, which is set forth as Title XIV of the Public
Health Service Act, requires the EPA to establish a program to protect these
sources. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j (1976).
33 According to the 1979 Annual Report of the Council on Environmental
Quality, air pollution is a major source of pollution of the Great Lakes by heavy
metals, lead in particular. 10 CouNcrr oNr ENvT'. QuALxr ANN. REP. 98-99
(1979). More generally, fallout from air pollution onto pavement can be a major
cause of "non-point source" water pollution when it is washed off by rain. Id.
86, 99-100. Some types of "scrubbers" to control emissions of sulfur oxides can
cause a solid waste problem by generating a "sludge" of the limestone slurry used
to remove the sulfur.
These links between air pollution and pollution of other types are not nearly
as strong as the four-way link between discharges into surface waters, the ocean,
or underground drinking water, and storage of the same material on land. See
note 35 infra. They are important enough, however, to be a point in favor of a
regulatory scheme that is capable of considering them.
3440 C.F.R. §§ 260-65 (1980). These regulations, which as originally pub-
lished in the Federal Register occupied 192 pages, designate several hundred
chemicals as "hazardous waste." Persons who generate or transport such wastes
must keep records of what is done with them, and the wastes may be disposed of
only at sites that have received a permit to do so. For a detailed description of
these regulations, see Rogers, RCRA Regs.: Enforcing EPA's Most Pervasive
Statute, Legal Times of Washington, May 12, 1980, at 23, col 1.
z3 RCRA . ..may be the most important environmental law, not just
because it creates a regulatory program for a broad range of activities
that until now were virtually untouched by government, but also because
RCRA may "back out" tough questions under a variety of other federal
pollution control laws--questions that we have not come to grips with
CLEAN AIR ACT
II. STATIONARY SOURCES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The following sections examine the present treatment of sta-
tionary sources under title I. After first providing a brief overview
of that tide, the discussion moves on to examine how the existing
regulatory structure conflicts with the objectives discussed above:
the incorporation of new knowledge, the achievement of efficient
regulation, and the maintenance of procedural simplicity and
consistency.
because ultimate disposal of pollutants never really bad to be considered
before.
Is it less dangerous to remove persistent and toxic substances from
the air and water, where they may be dispersed in low concentrations,
and place them in the ground in very high concentrations? Even if it
may be safer to collect these pollutants and bring them somewhere, is it
worth the cost (including the energy costs)? Where should these
pollutants-some of which last and are toxic for several generations (or
are elements and are around forever)-be placed and who should be
involved in deciding where they should go?
Heavy metals such as chrome and cadmium are discharged into city
sewers by a number of manufacturing concerns. Under the Clean Water
Act, there are standards based on technology, rather than calculated effects
on the receiving water, that require installation of pollution control equip-
ment at each discharging facility to collect most of these metals. The
owner of the plant then must find a way to dispose of the metals.
The new RCRA regulations-which are based on potential effects
on the environment-rather than on availability of disposal technology-
may make it difficult, and certainly more costly, for this businessman to
find a satisfactory disposal option.
He may consider incineration, but this activity may run afoul of the
Clean Air Act regulations, which have been ... largely designed to protect
the air around us-and not to protect the air around us only to the extent
it doesn't cause greater damage to the groundwaters under us. The ocean
dumping laws were drafted with little consideration of the relative dan-
gers of on-land disposal; Congress (and EPA's regulations carry out this
theme) wanted the oceans free of possibly damaging pollution.
Role of Cost Analysis
Under each disposal option, the costs vary, and under each law, the
ability of EPA to consider costs also varies. Under the Clean Water
Act's pretreatment standards, costs and economic impact must be con-
sidered. Under the Clean Air Act it depends on what section is relied
on.... Under the ocean dumping law, costs of alternatives play a minor
role. Under RCRA, it is unclear what role economics has.
So, as the molecules of chrome and cadmium compounds pass from
factory to sewer to river, to landfill, or to incinerator or ocean-going barge,
they pass from one regulatory authority to another, from one law to
another. Different congressional committees have drafted detailed laws
that respond to different environmental concerns, that respond to interest
groups that are surprisingly tied to consideration of issues in the context
of a single medium.
Finding and executing overall solutions to the problems of disposal
of toxic and persistent substances and molding amendments to the older
environmental laws to allow this to take place, will be the environmental
challenge for Congress in the 1980s.
Rogers, supra note 34, at 31, col. 2.
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A. An Overview of Title I
Title I of the Act employs a variety of approaches in regulating
stationary sources. It mingles a number of technology-based re-
quirements with its predominantly ambient approach. It also
utilizes two different procedural vehicles-broad state-wide regula-
tory plans and source-specific permits-to articulate its substantive
requirements. Finally, the Act contains a number of different
methods for making its programs work across the federal-state divide.
The complexities, both avoidable and unavoidable, that this diversity
of approaches and procedures leads to are described below.
1. What SIPS Are Based On
The major theme of title I of the Act is the regulation of
stationary sources through state implementation plans (SIPs) to
achieve various air quality goals.36  Part A of the title 7 provides
the basic framework. It commands the EPA to issue air quality
criteria for any widespread air pollutant that "may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 38 The EPA, on
the basis of these criteria, must then set "national ambient air
quality standards" (NAAQSs). These may be "primary" NAAQSs,
which must be tight enough to "protect the public health," 39 or
"secondary" NAAQSs, which must protect against harm to the
public "welfare." "Welfare" effects include visibility impairment
and damage to buildings and plant or animal life.40
36The subtheme of title I is installation of technology to control air pollution
without direct reference to air quality benefits. To a great extent, the permits that
every new source over a certain size must obtain impose these requirements. See
text accompanying notes 96 & 97 infra. In addition, since 1970 the statute has
allowed the EPA to set "new source performance standards" that require categories
of new sources to achieve the emission reductions "achievable through the appli-
cation of the best system of continuous emission reduction which (taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any nonair quality
health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated for that category of sources." 42
U.S.C. §7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979). Finally, the statute authorizes the
Agency to establish emission standards for "hazardous air pollutants" that are ap-
plicable on a plant-by-plant basis without detailed calculations of the plant-specific
ambient effects. Id. § 7412.
For further discussion of these provisions, see Currie, Direct Federal Regulation
of Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 128 U. PA. L. PIEv. 1389 (1980).
3742 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7428 (Supp. I1 1979).
381d. § 7408 (a) (1) (A).
39d. § 7409(b). See generally Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 78-2201 and
78-2220 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 15, 1980), modifying Nos. 78-2201 and 78-2220
(D.C. Cir., filed June 27, 1980).
4042 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2) (Supp. III 1979). The statute requires secondary
standards "to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse
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The Act further requires each state to submit an implementa-
tion plan detailing how it will attain the NAAQSs promulgated
by the EPA.41 The plans are intended to be comprehensive
bundles of strategies and commands, containing all the requirements
necessary to attain the NAAQSs in that state.42 The Act established
this procedure in 1970, contemplating a reduction in air pollution
to the level of primary NAAQSs by 1977 at the latest.43 In 1971,
the EPA issued its most important air quality standards, 4 and most
effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." Id.
A subsequent section then glosses this language as follows: "All language referring
to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops,
vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate,
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as
effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being." Id. § 7602(h).
The present secondary standards, however, only take account of certain types
of damage to vegetatiqn, and are explicitly not designed to protect visibility in
regions where the air is naturally very clear. See CoImrrrEE ox INTEBSTATE AND
Foa~mcr COMMEMCE, CLEAN Am AcT AMENDumNTs OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 294,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 204-05, reprinted in [1977] U.S. ConE CONG. & Am. NEWS
1077, 1283-85.
Literal compliance with the statute would have been very expensive, and quite
probably unwise from a policy standpoint. Air quality standards, both primary
and secondary, are meant to be nationally uniform. Yet, certain plant or animal
species, or particularly clear ranges of natural visibility, exist only in limited por-
tions of the country, and it would make little sense to impose everywhere a
standard that produced benefits only in restricted areas. Probably for this reason,
Congress has not really quarreled with the EPA's restrained approach to secondary
standards, but has instead enacted additional programs to "prevent significant
deterioration" of clean air, particularly in national park and monument areas, see
notes 46-48 infra, and to preserve or restore exceptionally clear visibility where it
naturally exists. 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (Supp. II 1979). Although this may be the
best approach in the end, the fact that such programs would not be necessary
under a literal reading of the "secondary standard" language introduces an incon-
sistency into the statute.
4142 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
42 See id. §§7410(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(J). See also Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65-67, 78-79, 80 (1975).
43 Section 110 of the Act, in both its present and its 1970 versions, requires
states to submit SIPs pertaining to an NAAQS within nine months of its promul-
gation, allows the EPA four months to rule on them, and requires attainment of
an NAAQS within three years of SIP approval. Id. §§ 7410(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(i).
Given the establishment of the main NAAQSs in 1971, see note 44 infra, this
worked out to an "attainment date" of 1975. However, a further two-year exten-
sion was allowed, 42 U.S.C. § 1710(e) (Supp. III 1979), and, because this extension
was granted in virtually all cases for which the 1975 deadline proved problematic,
1977 became the effective deadline for meeting the primary NAAQSs.
44 See 36 Fed. Reg. 8,186 (1971) (ambient air quality standards for sulfur
dioxide, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants (ozone),
and nitrogen dioxide). The Agency has slightly revised the secondary standard
for sulfur oxide, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,678 (1973), has relaxed both primary and
secondary standards for photochemical oxidants by 509, and has eliminated the
specific standard for hydrocarbons. See note 11 supra. The EPA has also estab-
lished primary and secondary NAAQSs for lead. 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978).
Current ambient air quality standards for sulfur dioxide, particulates, carbon
monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead are codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.4-.12
(1980).
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states submitted implementation plans by 1972. 1977's arrival,
however, revealed widespread failure to reach the clean-up level of
the primary standards.
In 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court opinion
that interpreted a largely silent statute as requiring the EPA to
prevent "significant deterioration" of the quality of air cleaner than
required by the NAAQSs.45 As a result, the Agency was enjoined
from approving SIPs that permitted such deterioration of air quality,
even if they were adequate to prevent pollution levels from
violating secondary standards.46 The EPA responded by issuing
the regulations necessary to establish a "prevention of significant
deterioration" (PSD) program.47 These regulations were then up-
held by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
48
The 1977 amendments to the Act explicitly adopted the PSD
program.49 Congress required that each state, subject to EPA
oversight, designate which areas within it were not attaining the
NAAQSs, which areas were attaining them, and which areas could
not be classified using the available information.50 Once these
"designations" were complete, each state was required to submit
SIP revisions to the EPA. These revisions had to contain "non-
attainment" provisions to cover areas that were not achieving the
standards, and PSD provisions for the other two types of areas.
As in 1970, in 1977 Congress required that SIPs for "nonattain-
ment" areas contain regulatory provisions that are sufficient to re-
duce air pollution to the level allowed by the applicable NAAQSs
by a specific, tight deadline.51 The plans were also required to
contain provisions mandating that each existing source install "rea-
45 Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
46See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem.,
4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom., Fri
v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) (requiring the EPA to establish a "prevention
of significant deterioration" program).
47 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).
4 8 Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding the EPA's
original PSD regulations issued in response to the first Sierra Club case).
49 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 160, 91 Stat. 731
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (Supp. III 1979)).
5042 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. HI 1979). The EPA then must publish a
list of these designations "with such modifications as [it] deems necessary." Id.
§ 7407(d)(2).
51 Primary NAAQSs for particulates and sulfur oxides must be attained by
December 31, 1982, id. 7502(a)(1); for carbon monoxide and photochemical
oxidants, the deadline can be as late as December 31, 1987. Id. §7502(a)(2).
The Report of the National Commission on Air Quality indicates that these dead-
lines will not be met in all areas. NAT'L CommissroN, supra note 12, at 2.1-23-25,
3.4-21-34.
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sonably available control technology" 52 and that new sources in-
stall a higher level of control technology and meet certain other
requirements.15 Plans for PSD areas were required to assure that
air pollution would not increase above existing levels by more
than statutorily specified amounts.5 4 The statute provides for doing
this, in the first instance, by detailed regulation of all new sources
over a certain size. The principal vehicles for such regulation are
source-specific permits, which include technology-based control pro-
visions.5 5 If that approach proves insufficient, the state must revise
its SIP in order to correct any inadequacy.56 In addition, by cut-
ting off federal funds and banning construction of major new
sources of air pollution if the required plans are not timely sub-
mitted, the statute strongly encourages states to draw up nonattain-
ment SIPs (but not PSD SIPs).
57
5242 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3).
53Id. §§7502(b)(6), 7503. See note 96 infra. In addition, SIPs for non-
attainment areas must be adequate to show "reasonable further progress" toward
the NAAQS as well as timely attainment of it, 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1), 7502(a),
(b)(3) (Supp. 111 1979), and must provide for a comprehensive inventory of the
emissions sources in the area. Id. § 7502(b) (4). In certain cases they must also
include a program for annual emissions testing of motor vehicles. Id. § 7502(b)
(11)(B). Nonattainment SIPs are also called 'Tart D" SIPs because the governing
statutory provisions are set forth in Part D of title I. Id. §§ 7501-7508.
54The requirements for PSD SIPs are contained in Part C of title L Id.
H9 7470-7479. These sections prescribe in detail the rules governing sulfur oxides
and particulates. They direct that all PSD areas be divided into "Class I" areas,
for which very little increase in pollution is permitted, "Class II," which may
become somewhat more polluted, and "Class HI," which in many cases may
deteriorate down to the level of the NAAQS. Id. §§ 7472, 7473(b). The statute
specifies precisely the maximum levels of sulfur dioxide or particulate increase (or
"increments") allowed for all three types of areas. Id. § 7473(b). It also specifies
the cases in which and the procedures by which an area may be "redesignated"
from one category to another. Id. § 7474.
The regulations implementing these provisions have been the subject of massive
legal controversy. The Agency promulgated its initial implementing regulations in
June 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380 (1978), and they were promptly challenged in
court. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a
preliminary opinion, upheld the EPA's choice of an effective date for the new
requirements. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1979). Its opinion on the merits, however, issued in both a preliminary version,
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and a superseding
final draft, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), invalidated major portions of those
requirements. The EPA has since promulgated its remand response, see 45 Fed.
Beg. 52,676 (1980), and renewed litigation is under way.
The EPA was also directed, under less detailed standards, to establish PSD
programs for nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and photochemical
oxidants. 42 U.S.C. § 7476 (Supp. HI 1979). The implementing regulations have
not yet been proposed.
55 See notes 96 & 97 infra.
5640 C.F.R. §51.24(a)(3) (1980). See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 323, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
57The statute in effect requires all SIPs to forbid the construction of any
major stationary source" in a nonattainment area after the date for submission of a
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SIPs, nonattainment designations, and PSD designations are
all specific to one of the six pollutants for which the EPA has de-
veloped NAAQSs. Any source of air pollution that emits more
than one such air pollutant, then, will be bound by separate SIPs-
separate regulatory systems-for each of those pollutants. In addi-
tion, where a given region is nonattainment for some pollutants
and PSD for others, the overlapping SIPs may be built on quite
different statutory foundations. The statute contains no mecha-
nism with which to coordinate the application of the different SIP
requirements to a source, either with each other or with the sep-
arate requirements set through permits.
2. Changes in the SIPs
The Act allows the static regulatory framework just described
to change over time in any of four major ways.
First, new data can show that, in the case of a nonattainment
SIP, the SIP is inadequate to attain the NAAQS in question by the
statutory deadline. In the case of a PSD SIP, new data can
show that the SIP will not hold pollution increases below the allow-
able levels. If either situation occurs, the SIP must be tightened.58
Second, new data can show that the SIP could achieve its pur-
pose with less strict controls, or with a different pattern of controls.
Alternatively, even in the absence of new data, a state that made the
policy decision to impose controls stricter than the federal minimum
may change its mind. In these cases the state that submitted the
SIP may elect to relax it.59
nonattainment SIP, unless that SIP has been submitted in satisfactory form. 42
U.S.C. §7410(a).(2)(I) (Supp. III 1979). See also id. §7506(a). In nonattain-
ment areas where "transportation controls" to reduce motor vehicle emissions will
be necessary, the statute provides for a cut-off of Department of Transportation and
EPA grant funds in similar circumstances. Id. § 7506(a). See also id. § 7413(a)(5).
58 The EPA may approve a SIP only if it
provides for revision, after public hearings .... whenever the Adminis-
trator finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan
is substantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality
primary or secondary standard which it implements or to otherwise comply
with any additional requirements established under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.
Id. § 7410(a) (2) (H).
59 "The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan
applicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets [the basic
requirements of the statute] and has been adopted by the State after reasonable
notice and public hearings." Id. § 7410(a)(3) (A).
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Third, an area may be "redesignated" from PSD to nonattain-
ment, or vice versa, and thus come under different statutory pro-
visions.6 0
Fourth, the EPA may amend the NAAQS on which the SIP
was built.0 1 To the extent the amendment results in a need for
more controls, they must be imposed; to the extent it would allow
existing controls to be relaxed, the states may elect to relax them.
2
If the EPA adopts a completely new NAAQS, the states must sub-
mit corresponding new SIPs.
Given the incomplete and evolving state of our knowledge in
the area, it is very likely that the conditions for making these
changes will frequently be met. The availability at any time of a
number of other minor, source-specific variances further increases
the likelihood of change.63
60"A State may from time to time review, and as appropriate revise and
resubmit, the list [of attainment, nonattainment, and unclassifiable areas] required
under this subsection. The Administrator shall consider and promulgate such
revised list in accordance with this subsection." Id. §7407(d)(5).
61"Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five-year intervals thereafter,
the Administrator shall complete a thorough review of the . . . national ambient
air quality standards ... and shall make such revisions ... and promulgate such
new standards as may be appropriate." Id. § 7409(d) (1).
The EPA did not meet the 1980 deadline for revising the five NAAQSs in
existence when the 1977 amendments were enacted. Although amendments to the
ozone standard were promulgated in 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 8,220 (1979) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1980)), those for carbon monoxide have only been proposed,
45 Fed. Reg. 55,066 (1980). A second draft of a proposed "criteria document" for
sulfur oxides and particulates has recently been made available for public comment.
46 Fed. Reg. 15,569 (1981). The Agency will have to rewrite that document in
light of the comments before revisions to the standards themselves can even be
proposed.
62The statute requires each state to submit a SIP to the EPA within nine
months after any "revision" of a primary or secondary NAAQS. 42 U.S.C.
§7410(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). This command is echoed by a subsequent clause
requiring each SIP to provide for its own amendment "from time to time as may
be necessary to take account of revisions of [any] national primary or secondary
standard." Id. §7410(a)(2)(H).
Although on the surface these provisions apply whether an NAAQS is loosened
or tightened, a state is always free to adopt a SIP more stringent than the national
standards require. Id. § 7416. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 263-64
(1976). Accordingly, the EPA would interpret state inaction after a standard had
been loosened as indicating that state's desire to invoke this authority. This circum-
stance would not call for any further moves by the Agency. By contrast, state
inaction after a standard had been tightened would almost certainly leave the SIP
inadequate to meet those new standards, and this would call for corrective measures
on the EPA's part.
63 Congress, in addition to the basic regulatory mechanism described above,
has also provided a long list of source-specific variances (and, occasionally, tighten-
ing changes) that can in effect amend other Clean Air Act requirements.
1. A source may obtain a four-year waiver of new source performance
standards in order to enable the installation of innovative technology. 42 U.S.C.
§7411(j) (Supp. 11 1979).
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3. The Double Key and Its Consequences
In addition to setting the possible routes for substantive
changes in regulatory requirements, the Act regulates the pro-
cedure by which such changes are made. It provides that a state
may change a SIP only "after reasonable notice and public hear-
ings." 6" Almost invariably these changes are made through state
rulemakings subject to state administrative procedure acts. 5 In
addition, the state, after completing its own procedures, must sub-
mit the result to the EPA for its approval. Upon receiving a state
plan or plan revision, the EPA publishes it in the Federal Register
for public comment, as required by the federal Administrative
Procedure Act.66 After considering the comments, it decides
2. A source may obtain a two-year waiver of a deadline for meeting hazardous
air pollutant requirements, conditioned in part on operating satisfactory interim
controls. Id. §7412(e)(1)(B)(ii).
3. A source may receive a "delayed compliance order" extending the time
allowed it for meeting SIP requirements. These may be granted because the
source will shut down soon, id. § 7413(d) (3), or because the Department of Energy
has ordered it to convert to coal from some other fuel, id. § 7413(d) (5) (A), or to
allow the installation of "innovative" control mechanisms, id. §7413(d)(4), or
simply because the source is "unable to comply" with applicable requirements, id.
§ 7413(d) (1). In each case the source must adopt interim controls and a schedule
for eventual full compliance.
4. Lead, zinc, and copper smelters may receive "nonferrous smelter orders"
greatly extending (upon certain conditions) the time allowed for coming into com-
pliance with other provisions of the Act. Id. § 7419.
5. To avoid local unemployment in the coal industry, major sources may be
ordered to bum only "locally or regionally derived coal or coal derivatives," and to
enter into coal and emission control system contracts to enable such burning.
Id. §7425.
6. The EPA may also order major sources to install additional controls to
abate their effects on air quality in states other than the one in which they are
located. Id. § 7426.
7. Major sources may be required to install "best available retrofit technology"
to correct pollution-caused visibility impairment in areas such as national parks
and monuments. Id. § 7491.
6 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. III 1979).
65 See Currie, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 27, 44 (1981).
66 The courts of appeals initially divided on the precise question of whether
EPA approval of a state SIP submission is "rulemaking" subject to the notice and
comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III 1979). Compare Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1973) (EPA approval of
state plan is rulemaking under § 553) with Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509
F.2d 839, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1975); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 8-9
(3d Cir. 1973), and Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500-03 (4th
Cir. 1973) (procedures set forth in § 553 do not apply to EPA approval of state
plan).
The Supreme Court has never settled the matter. However, since these cases
were decided the EPA has concluded that its approval of state submissions requires
the use of rulemaking procedures. In five recent cases, various courts of appeals
have accepted this concession and have made it the foundation of their decisions on
the procedures required for EPA approval of attainment or nonattainment designa-
tions under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. III 1979). The
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whether the state submission conforms, entirely or in part, to the
requirements of the Act. To the extent that it does, the EPA pub-
lishes a final rule approving the plan, which then becomes enforce-
able as federal law.67
In other words, any change that a state wants to make in a
SIP, no matter how routine, requires both state and EPA approval,
and, generally, two rounds of public notice and comment. Both
actors must turn the key before any new requirement is established.
Most of the work on the EPA's side is handled by its ten regional
offices. 68 In these offices, the double-key system compels the EPA
staff responsible for SIP revisions to spend a lot of time simply
pushing paper. Any regulatory system as complicated as a SIP
for an industrial state demands constant change. Requiring notice
and comment and affirmative approval even for routine changes
that the state has approved results in a substantial diversion of
staff time to considering those changes. The costs in state and
industry time of shepherding SIP revisions through the EPA must
be equally substantial.
In short, the existing SIP system combines two vices. Because
of continuously evolving knowledge, its scientific and technical
foundations are perpetually subject to change. The statute, how-
ever, provides no mechanism for scheduling any regulatory reac-
tions to new scientific understandings. The regulatory changes that
are proposed in response to them are therefore frequently unpre-
dictable and disruptive. On the other hand, the double key makes
implementing proposed changes extraordinarily difficult. The con-
sequences of these two organizational defects are examined in the
following sections.
EPA lost three of those cases for its failure to follow § 553 procedures; in the two
others, the court found that the Agency had "good cause" for omitting those
procedures. Compare New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); U.S.
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979), and Sharon Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979) with Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d
797 (6th Cir. 1980) and United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th
Cir. 1979).
If rulemaking procedures are required for the approvals of state designations,
which only begin the regulatory process that leads to binding requirements, a
fortiori they are required for the approvals of state SIPs, which actually establish
those requirements.
67 See note 85 infra.
68 Each state in the United States is located in one of the ten EPA "Regions,"
headquartered in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, Kansas City,
Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle. The regional office corresponding to
a given state is responsible for ensuring that EPA programs are carried out satis-
factorily in that state, either through the state's own programs, or, where necessary,
by superseding federal action. Review of state SIP submissions, and preparation
of substitute provisions for the EPA to promulgate where necessary, fit naturally
into this basic assignment.
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B. Resistance to New Knowledge
As we have seen, evolving scientific and technical knowledge
will frequently suggest that a SIP's control requirements for a par-
ticular source, or group of sources, are either more lenient or are
stricter than the statute requires.6 9 If these requirements are found
to be too lenient, the letter of the Act requires the control agency
to promptly tighten the SIP. No regulatory system-and no regu-
lated industry-however, can function acceptably if it is subject to
continual, unpredictable tightening of requirements. The EPA
has shown, therefore, an increasing tendency, at least in the short
term, to look away from information calling for tighter SIP require-
ments, unless it is truly dramatic.70  That tendency is bound to
increase as the deadline for attaining the standards draws closer,
because that deadline will make changes more disruptive and less
practical by shortening the time allowed for compliance.
If SIP requirements are too strict, it will of course not be
comparably difficult for the system to accommodate relaxation, al-
though some confusion may result. This creates in the SIPs a
procedural tendency towards a gradual loosening of control require-
ments without reference to the technical merits involved. The
somewhat ironic result, then, of the Act's requirement that all new
knowledge be reflected promptly in emissions controls is a tendency
to ignore or discount many types of new knowledge.
The "double-key" procedural framework only makes this prob-
lem worse. By making changes cumbersome, time-consuming, and
costly, it further reduces, almost by definition, the system's ability
to adapt to new knowledge. In addition, if the EPA falls behind
in processing SIP changes-and it is behind at present-the assimila-
tion of new knowledge is further delayed.
71
69 See notes 58-63 srupra & accompanying text.
70 Under the EPA's "bubble" policy, sources can shift emissions from points
where control costs are high to points where they are low as long as no adverse
impact on air quality results from the reallocation. See text accompanying notes
25-28 supra. The EPA originally required "modelling" of many of these changes to
verify the lack of adverse impact. However, when modelling results began to
show that in many cases not only the suggested new pattern of emissions, but the
existing one as well, violated air quality requirements-thereby suggesting a legal
duty to impose more control-the EPA significantly revised its modelling require-
ments. See Memorandum from David Hawkins, Assistant Administrator for Air,
Noise, and Radiation, to EPA Regional Administrators (August 14, 1980) (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
71 The National Commission on Air Quality confirmed the existence of approval
delays and identified them as a source of friction in the statute. "In some cases,
the delay in EPA approval of state-submitted revisions to the [state implementation]
plans causes the regulatory portions of a federally enforceable plan to differ from
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C. Economic Inefficiency
As discussed, economists have linked economically efficient pol-
lution controls to a market-based system.72 In the context of the
Clean Air Act, as a practical matter this probably means some form
of "pollution rights" approach3 3 That approach would place two
distinct procedural demands on any system implementing it. First,
because a basic purpose of the market approach is to replace general
standards with individual emission limits that reflect source-specific
costs, the regulatory system that implements it must also function
in terms of source-specific requirements. Second, because every
trade in pollution rights must change those source-specific limits,
the efficiency gains of a market approach will not be fully realized
unless it is in practice easy to make the regulatory changes needed
to reflect those market choices.
Under the current statute, the source-specific monitoring and
control requirements needed to make a market system effective must
be processed as SIP revisions through the double key in order to
allow formal EPA review and federal enforcement. Any active
trading system among the country's 200,000 regulated sources of air
pollution 4 would certainly generate more transactions than the
present SIP mechanism could process in any reasonable time. In-
deed, even today the need to process "bubble" and "offset" trades
as SIP revisions greatly obstructs the growth of these transactions.7
This problem is exacerbated by a further characteristic of the
existing SIPs. The Act has never provided any set form or format
for SIPs or SIP provisions. Many states responded to this latitude,
when SIP submissions were first required in 1971, by simply com-
piling their state air pollution control statutes, regulations, codes,
ordinances, and possibly some permits, and submitting the whole
bundle, along with the minimum changes necessary to meet the
Act's standards, to the EPA. Congress, in 1977, reacted by requir-
ing the EPA to compile, summarize, and publish annually the
the regulations enforced by the state." NAT'L CommissioN, supra note 12, at
2.1-15. See also id. 3.2-30-31.
72 See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
73 See notes 23-28 supra & accompanying text.
74This estimate of the number of regulated sources is taken from undated
EPA briefing materials supplied to the U.S. Senate Environment & Public Works
Committee (Winter 1981) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
75 NAT'L CommissioN, supra note 12, at 2.1-84-85.
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regulatory requirements of each SIP.76 The new submissions re-
quired by the 1977 amendments, however, have swamped any poten-
tial beneficial effects. One letter described the Oregon SIP as "a
jumble of unindexed masses of material . . . approximately 2000
pages long, including 1979 revisions of nearly 1000 pages. There is
no index and only a brief table of contents." 77 It added that
"[t]he SIPs of other states are no better." 7s
Broadly worded generic provisions are plainly ill-suited
to provide the type of source-specific controls and data required by
a "pollution rights" market. Absent such controls, trading would
be difficult to police and abuses would be likely. Less dramatically,
the system would be inefficient, both in supplying information to
potential traders and in recording actual transactions.
D. Procedural Complexity
In addition to possessing the mechanical and policy defects just
mentioned, the double-key system is constructed, the pieties of the
statute notwithstanding,79 on an expensive distrust of the states.
There is little purpose in having a federalized regulatory scheme
7642 U.S.C. §7410(h) (Supp. III 1979).
77 Letter from John E. Bonine and Gary Kahn to Douglas M. Costle (April
18, 1980), at 6 (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Mr. Bonine was the EPA's Associate General Counsel for Air Quality in 1976 and
1977 and worked on the Clean Air Act as a staff attorney from 1972 until 1975.
78 Id.
Recent actions by the Office of the Federal Register provide additional support
for Mr. Bonine's remarks. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)
(1976), provides that material with regulatory effect must either be published
verbatim in the Federal Register or incorporated by reference with the approval
of the Director of the Office of the Federal Register. See Appalachian Power Co.
v. Train, 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977). Because the publication of SIPs thousands
of pages long in the Federal Register is plainly impractical, the EPA has always
incorporated state SIPs by reference. About a year ago, however, the Director
refused to allow this practice to continue until the SIPs were submitted in a more
organized form. This directive, which the Agency has complied with, has never
been reduced to writing.
The condition of the state SIPs has also been criticized by the National
Commission on Air Quality. See NAT'L CommissioN, supra note 12, at 2.1-5,
3.2-30-31.
The lack of specificity in the SIPs extends to the substance of their require-
ments as well as to their form. For example, in Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499
F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir. 1974), the EPA's approval of a plan to limit traffic
by reducing parking was challenged as overly broad. The Second Circuit upheld
the EPA's action, although the plan stated only that "it is estimated that available
parking spaces also should be reduced by 30 to 40 percent," and did not specify
a precise approach. A year later, in Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165,
171 n.7 , 180 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit directed a district judge to enforce
by injunction this provision of the plan.
79 See note 92 infra.
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without some central check on state action. The double key, how-
ever, assumes that formal, documented, public review of every state
action is always needed to carry out the law. It would be more
appropriate to the design of a federalized regulatory system to
structure control requirements around the assumption that states
will generally do the right thing, and that only the exceptions need
be subjected to detailed public review. Unfortunately, under the
existing system, it is precisely the low priority changes, involving
innocuous changes or housekeeping matters, that are most slowly
processed. The statute paradoxically creates the greatest delay in
those areas that are most routine.
All the difficulties described above arise out of the simple
mechanics of establishing SIPs and keeping them current. If legal
conflict and resistance are taken into account, relations between
jurisdictions grow even more intricate. Although probably no
federalized regulatory statute can avoid such complexities alto-
gether, the present approach makes them worse through its use of
excessively tight deadlines and its lack of any mechanisms for
scheduling or channeling change. More specifically, two varieties
of problems can arise. First, the legal foundations on which a state
built its SIP can change after the EPA has approved it. Second, a
state, through inaction, can compel the EPA to promulgate a SIP
on its own.
1. Problems with State SIPs
The Act requires that any state SIP submission be adequately
supported by state law standing alone, and that this support be
documented.80 Once approved by the EPA through Administrative
Procedure Act procedures, however, a state submission becomes
federally enforceable and, on its federal side, can be changed only
with EPA approval. It therefore looks very much like a federal
regulation.
This dual nature of SIPs creates unavoidable conceptual diffi-
culties. What state law authorizes or commands may not be com-
pletely clear, and laws of course can change. The EPA may
therefore base its approval of a state submission on a simple mis-
understanding of state law, an administrative interpretation of a
80 The EPA may not approve a state SIP submission unless it "provides . * .
necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding, and
.authority to carry out such implementation plan ..... 42 U.S.C. § 7 410(a) (2)(F)
(Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
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state statute or regulation that the state courts then reject, a case
that is overruled, a statute that is amended, or regulations that are
remanded for being, for example, too expensive, technologically
infeasible, or procedurally deficient. In such instances, the statutory
premise that the SIP represents the final judgment of the state has
been invalidated. Yet the requirement will have been federally
adopted like any other rule, and will not have been rejected by
a federal court. The courts have not definitively settled whether
a federally approved state SIP provision that has lost effect on the
state level remains in effect as federal law. Under the current law,
good arguments exist on each side.
The position that the SIP remains federally binding is probably
the only one that is consistent with a rapid national effort to place
major new controls on air pollution through SIPs. SIPs are state-
wide regulatory nets that can easily take five years or more to bar-
gain, promulgate, litigate, and amend to complete acceptability at
the state level.8 ' Because SIP provisions are often phrased in gen-
eral terms, legal action overturning a requirement may, even if
prompted by one source's circumstances, call into question the
validity of the requirements for many other sources that never raised
a protest. If SIP amendments took effect on the federal level at the
same time they became effetcive at the state level, a state might
defer effective control indefinitely by amending its regulations as
soon as they begin to bite. In most cases, the EPA would need
several years to promulgate a plan of its own for the missing por-
tions. Moreover, because the Act always allows a state to displace a
federal plan by submitting satisfactory requirements of its own,
2
the EPA, despite its statutory duty to act quickly, has every bureau-
cratic reason to slacken even this slow pace whenever a state gives
somewhat believable assurances of future self-correction. Finally,
81 When, in 1972, Ohio failed to submit a satisfactory SIP to control sulfur
oxides, as the 1970 amendments required, the EPA took until 1976 to promulgate
a substitute plan. Not until 1978 were the ensuing legal challenges resolved,
allowing enforcement of the plan as a practical matter. Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1152-56 (6th Cir. 1978).
Similarly, when the EPA found a portion of Idaho's 1972 submission inade-
quate, it did not promulgate a substitute until 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,584 (1975).
The substitute was itself overturned by the courts two years later. Bunker Hill
Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
82 The Act does not state this conclusion directly. It follows logically, how-
ever, from the provisions requiring the EPA to approve any state submission that
meets the minimum requirements of § 110. See note 59 supra. Under this lan-
guage a state could displace a federal promulgation by submitting satisfactory
regulations of its own, together with a statement that these regulations would apply
instead of any earlier promulgation. The package as a whole would meet the
statutory test and the EPA would be required to approve it.
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the lack of any mechanism for scheduling SIP changes invites con-
tinual efforts at legislative or regulatory amendments. All of these
considerations converge to increase the disruptive potential of liti-
gation or other legal change at the state level and to put pressure
on the EPA to find a way to contain it.
The major argument against keeping in effect at the federal
level SIPs that have been rejected by a state is that doing so could
establish regulatory requirements effectively shielded from judicial
review. The Supreme Court has established that, because states
are always free to choose air quality that is cleaner than required
by the national standards, the EPA may not disapprove a state
SIP that is stricter than needed to attain those standards. Accord-
ingly, in deciding whether to approve a state SIP, the Agency may
not consider whether its requirements are stricter than necessary,
or even whether they are so strict as to be technologically or eco-
nomically infeasible.8 3  Where the state law supporting those
stricter standards falls, the logic behind that argument falls with it.
Yet if those standards have meanwhile been approved by the EPA,
they may well stay on the books for a year or more, even if the EPA
intends to change them.
The EPA has dealt with this dilemma through an under-
standable compromise. The Agency has represented to various
federal courts that if a state court rejects a SIP provision, the EPA
will amend the SIP if the state does not.s Where the legislature
or a state agency has made the change at issue, however, the EPA
has refused to acknowledge it if it would make the SIP inadequate.
2. Problems with EPA SIPs
If a state SIP submission does not meet the requirements of the
Act, the EPA must disapprove it.85 If the revision in question
83 The Administrator's position is that he has no power whatsoever to reject
a state implementation plan on the ground that it is economically or
technologically infeasible .... After surveying the relevant provisions of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and their legislative history, we
agree that Congress intended claims of economic and technological in-
feasibility to be wholly foreign to the Administrator's consideration of a
state implementation plan.
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976).
s4 [P]etitioners have a right to challenge the reasonableness of state plans
in the state courts, and as the respondent [EPA] concedes, if "part of a
state implementation plan is held invalid by a state court, the state would
have to revise that part. Should the state fail to do so, the Administrator
must propose and promulgate a revision."
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 847 (7th Cir. 1975).
85 Section 110(a) (2) of the Act requires the EPA to "approve or disapprove"
any state SIP within four months after the date required for its submission, and
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was not necessary to satisfy those requirements, the EPA disap-
proval ends the matter, though the state remains free to resubmit
the revisions after curing the deficiencies that the EPA identified.
If the submission in question is necessary under the statute,
however, then upon disapproving it the EPA must take regulatory
action on its own to cure the deficiencies. Specifically, after dis-
approving the state submission it must publish proposed regulations
setting forth an adequate SIP. 8 That proposal will be subject
not to the normal Administrative Procedure Act procedures, but
to somewhat more elaborate notice-and-comment requirements
mandated by the Clean Air Act.87
A state may also fail to amend its SIP in a way that the statute
requires. If this failure extends beyond sixty days after the EPA
has formally called for a "SIP revision," the statute allows the
Agency to promulgate the necessary provisions on its own. s The
Act appears to require an EPA-promulgated SIP, unlike a state
SIP, to be no more stringent than necessary to achieve the statutory
goals, 9 and subjects the agency's determinations in pursuit of this
then lists the findings required for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (Supp. III
1979).
86 The Administrator shall . . . promptly prepare and publish proposed
regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for
a State if-
(A) the State fails to submit an implementation plan which meets
the requirements of this section,
(B) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is
determined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the
requirements of this section, or
(C) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by the Admin-
istrator or such longer period as he may prescribe, to revise an imple-
mentation plan . . . [in response to a finding that the existing plan is
inadequate or in response to a new or changed NAAQS].
42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
87 See id. § 7607. Although EPA promulgation of SIPs is explicitly made
subject to these special procedures, approval or disapproval of state submissions is
not. See id. §7607(d)(1).
88 See note 86 supra.
89 Neither the courts nor Congress have definitively resolved this issue, but the
weight of judicial precedent supports holding the EPA to the minimum standards
that will satisfy the statute. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), which
held that the EPA could not reject a state SIP for overstringency, did not address
this point. The Court's conclusion, however, relied on the argument that the states
could, and presumably would, consider issues bearing on overstringency in drawing
up the SIP. Id. 266-67. When the EPA promulgates a SIP it acts in the state's
place, and therefore its SIP shoud reflect that same consideration.
In addition, the Court, in reserving the issue, cited two appellate opinions
suggesting that such consideration is required. Id. 261 n.7 (citing District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1974); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974)). Other lower courts have reached the same result.
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end to review in the courts of appeals under the "arbitrary or ca-
pricious" standard normally used for agency regulations.90 EPA-
promulgated SIPs therefore approach the character of purely federal
regulations. States are free to enforce EPA promulgations in their
own courts if they wish, but generally have no obligation to do so.91
Both the statute 92 and EPA policy,93 however, strongly favor state,
not federal, action to establish SIP requirements. Beyond that,
See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1974). But cf. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1978) (wide
latitude granted the EPA in determining the feasibility of proposed controls).
9042 U.S.C. §4607(d)(9) (Supp. I1 1979).
9lAny general attempt to force state and local legislative and executive
branches to use their governmental powers to carry out the Clean Air Act would
raise serious constitutional questions. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976). The EPA has never asserted such authority.
No one disputes, however, that a state or local government may be federally
compelled to clean up a source of pollution that it owns itself. The Agency has
used this logic to argue that these governments, as owners of highways, without
which automobile traffic would not be possible, may be compelled to take steps to
reduce automobile emissions, because those highways constitute a "but-for" cause
of the emissions. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973).
This argument met a mixed reception in the courts of appeals. See Maryland
v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
971, 981-95 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975);
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). The issue was appealed to
the Supreme Court, which declined to decide it. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99
(1977).
92 The Act begins with a finding that "the prevention and control of air pollu-
tion at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments."
42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3) (Supp. I1 1979). This theme echoes through the legis-
lative history of the 1977 amendments. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note
40, at 1, 7-8, 10, 11, 12, 15-16, 25-26, 141, 143, 146-52, 178-79, 195, 197-201,
201-02, 211, 213-14, 313, 326, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1077, passim; S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 10-12, 15-16, 29-31, 57-58
(1977). Although the actual provisions of the law often "render quite hollow the
statutory catechism that pollution control is primarily a state responsibility," Currie,
supra note 36, at 1469, the nominal preference for state action still creates pressure
for delegation to states where that is allowed.
93 This policy cannot be taken, of course, to the point of approving inadequate
state SIPs. Under the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (Supp.
III 1979), a federal employee above a certain rank must enter into "performance
agreements" with his or her immediate superior. These are meant to be contracts
spelling out what the two expect the employee to accomplish in the next year.
Those who perform exceptionally well in fulfilling these agreements are eligible
for cash bonuses. Those who perform poorly can be fired. See id. §§ 4301-4305;
id. §§ 4311-4315. A number of performance agreements in one EPA region pro-
posed to evaluate employees in charge of SIP review solely by the number of SIPs
they approved. The approach was dropped after the EPA's General Counsel
pointed out that the law requires the EPA to disapprove inadequate SIPs, and
that unbiased compliance with this provision could hardly be expected from persons
whose salary and job security rested on the absence of disapprovals. Memorandum
from Michele Beigel Corash, General Counsel, EPA, to David Hawkins, Assistant
Administrator for Air, Noise and Radiation, and William Drayton, Jr., Assistant
Administrator for Planning and Management (March 4, 1980) (copy on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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EPA promulgation brings with it an additional problem. As
noted earlier, when a state promulgates a plan, it can control pol-
lution levels as tightly as it likes, but when the EPA promulgates
one, it probably must be as lenient as it can be while achieving
the statute's goals. What happens when the Agency promulgates
a plan that later data suggest is stricter than absolutely necessary?
The obvious answer-that the EPA must revise the plan to conform
to the test applied at promulgation-is not as clear as it seems.
Rigorously followed, it would permanently label each piece of a
SIP with the name of the level of government that promulgated it,
perhaps many years ago. At the logical extreme, the different
duties associated with the different labels would persist even though
SIP segments of state and federal origin might be so closely related
that it would be desirable or necessary to amend them together,
and even though the state might in effect have adopted the federal
promulgation by taking it over and enforcing it. The EPA would
have a duty to amend and keep current those portions of a plan
that it had originated, but not those that the state had originated.
Unfortunately, any attempt to draw back from these consequences
blurs the clear line that makes the problems easy to handle con-
ceptually.
3. The Permit Theme
Title I of the Clean Air Act employs permits as vehicles for its
regulatory requirements almost as extensively as it uses SIPs.
While the SIP provisions fit together into a scheme possessing at
least conceptual unity, however, the permit requirements, largely
1977 additions to the statute, have never been spliced into its basic
structure. Although the problems that arise in the use of permits
are less dramatic and have fewer implications than those created
by SIPs, their practical significance is equally great.
a. What Permits Are Based On
Title I explicitly provides for two major types of permit pro-
grams. First, it uses permits to ensure that all new sources of air
pollution above a certain size meet certain minimum, technology-
based levels of control, and that they do not interfere with the
statute's overall objectives. Second, but in a far less decisive
manner, it calls for some permit programs to control existing
sources. More particularly, the Act requires every newly con-
structed "major facility" in both nonattainment and PSD areas to
obtain a permit. The exact threshold differs between the two
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types of areas; 94 in any event, only a relatively small number, even
of new sources, falls under this requirement. 5
To obtain a permit in a nonattainment area, a source, in addi-
tion to meeting other conditions, must install controls capable of
matching the strictest standards imposed on the industry elsewhere,
and must show that the new emissions it will contribute after con-
trols will not interfere with its area's progress toward attainment.90
94 Under the PSD program, any source with the "potential to emit" 100 tons
or more each year of "any air pollutant" must obtain a permit if it falls in one of
28 industrial categories listed in the statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479 (Supp.
III 1979). The list includes steam electric power plants, industrial boilers, coal
cleaning plants, oil refineries, and copper smelters. Id. §7479(1). Sources not
specifically included in the list must obtain permits if they have the "potential to
emit" 250 tons or more per year of any air pollutant. Id. § 7479(1).
In nonattainment areas, review extends to any source of whatever nature with
the potential to emit 100 tons annually. Id. §§7502(b)(6), 7602(j).
The D.C. Circuit has ruled that these numerical cutoffs must be measured
against a source's emissions after installation of emission controls, not against what
the emissions would have been absent such controls. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
It has also ruled, however, that a permit is required if the source would
exceed the threshold for any pollutant, whether or not it is one for which the
area is classified "nonattainment" or "PSD," and whether or not it is one for which
an NAAQS has been established. Id. 405-06.
95 Though no precise figures are available, EPA staff familiar with the program
estimate that around 2,000 new sources a year fall under these permit requirements,
while at least ten times that many new sources are created annually.
Under the statute, any "modification" of a major source must also be reviewed.
The D.C. Circuit has greatly expanded the potential reach of this requirement by
holding that any modifications that increase emissions above a "de minimis" level
must be reviewed, and by rejecting the EPA's limitation of the requirement to "modi-
fications" that themselves increase emissions by more than the 100 or 250 ton per
year statutory thresholds. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 399-400
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
Vhatever the legal merits of the D.C. Circuit's position, it certainly seems
perverse from a policy standpoint for two reasons. First, it creates a different
threshold for the review of modifications than for the review of new sources, even
though the impact on air quality of a given emissions increase would be the same
in either case. Second, if there must be a difference in standards, it seems
unreasonable to set the threshold lower for modifications of existing sources, where
the air quality impact will already be known in general and where further control
through retrofitting may be difficult, than for new sources, where the air quality
impacts will be largely unlmown and where a wider range of control options is
probably available.
96 More specifically, an applicant for a permit to construct in a "nonattainment"
area must:
1. Demonstrate that even if the new source is constructed, thereby causing
new emissions, emissions from other sources will be reduced by more than enough
to offset those new emissions and thus continue the area's "reasonable further
progress" toward the standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1) (Supp. III 1979);
2. Demonstrate that all other major sources in the same state owned by the
same person are in compliance with air pollution requirements, or on a binding
compliance schedule, id. § 7503 (3);
3. Demonstrate that the applicable SIP is being enforced, id. § 7503(4), and
4. Install technology capable of controlling emissions to the 'lowest achievable
emissions rate," id. § 7503(2). The statute defines this rate as the tightest feasible
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A permit for a PSD area can be issued only if the source, among
other things, installs the "best available control technology," 97
analyzes in detail its own impact on air quality, and shows that its
added emissions would not increase pollution in the area above the
statutorily specified "increments." 08
Beyond these provisions for new sources, the statute also re-
quires all SIPs to contain "a program to provide for the .
regulation of the modification, construction and operation of any
stationary source . . . as necessary to assure . . . that national
ambient air quality standards are attained and maintained." 99 This
murky language apparently allows the EPA to require permit pro-
grams for attainment and maintenance beyond what the statute
explicitly calls for. The Agency has not vigorously pursued this
possibility.'00
b. Procedures for Permits
The Act requires only an informal public hearing before PSD
permits are issued, 1 1 and imposes no procedural requirements at all
on the issuance of operating permits or permits in nonattainment
areas. Although it contemplates state issuance of all these permits,
it provides no clearly available mechanism for EPA oversight along
the lines of the double-key requirement for SIPs.102 Congress could
control required by any SIP anywhere for that class of source, or the tightest control
attained in practice, whichever is lower. Id. § 7501(3).
97 id. §§ 7475(a) (4), (a) (8).
98 More specifically, under the statute, an applicant for a PSD permit must:
1. Analyze the projected direct and indirect air quality impacts, id. §§ 7475(e),
(a)(6);
2. Agree to install any monitoring equipment necessary to determine the actual
air quality impact, id. § 7475(a)(7);
3. Demonstrate that the new source will not violate any requirement of the
Act, whether or not related to the PSD program, id. §§7475(a)(3), (a)(5), and
4. Install the "best available control technology" (BACT), id. §§ 7475 (a) (4),
(a) (8). This in turn is defined as the maximum achievable reduction taking into
account "energy, environmental and economic impacts and other costs." Id.
§ 7479(3). In no event, however, can BACT be less stringent than any standard
established under §§ 111 or 112 of the statute. Id. § 7479(3). See note 36 supra.
99 Id. § 7410(a) (2) (D).
100 Nevertheless, according to a study done for the EPA, 46 states have some
form of air pollution control permit program already, and 24 states regulate both
old and new sources through permits. GCA Corporation, Summary of Existing
State Operating Permit Program Regulations 3 (1979). See also Currie, supra
note 65, at 66, 65-69 (listing the advantages of permits and stating that "nearly
every state pollution statute requires permits for the construction or operation of
potential sources, or for both.").
10142 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (Supp. 1I1 1979).
102 Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, supra
note 3, at 62 (1980).
Section 167 of the Act allows the EPA to "take such measures, including ...
seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to prevent the construction of a major
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have included permits in the SIPs for enforcement purposes, even
after dispensing with the double key, but it appears instead to have
excluded permits from the SIPs completely. The text of the statute
refers repeatedly to the need for SIPs to "require" or "provide for"
a permit program, not for the permits themselves to be included.l0o
This approach suffers from two immediate practical deficiencies.
First, if a state proposes to issue a permit that does not fulfill
its purpose under the federal statute, the EPA cannot readily stop it.
That is true even though many permits could have a direct effect
on the attainment of levels of air quality established as national
regulatory goals by the Act.
Second, the statute provides a far more workable and compre-
hensive federal enforcement scheme for SIPs than for permits stand-
ing alone. SIPs can be federally enforced by the EPA'104 or by
"citizens' suits." 's Although citizens' suits can request only in-
junctive relief, the EPA can request either injunctive relief or a
range of civil or criminal penalties.106 Non-SIP permits, by con-
trast, often cannot be federally enforced at all, or can be enforced
only by injunction. 07
These difficulties apart, it seems philosophically inconsistent
not to include permits in the SIP. A SIP is designed to include all
measures needed to meet the applicable air quality goals, and it
will not pass that basic test if it only sets forth a general permit
emitting facility which does not conform to the requirements of . . . [the Act's
PSD provisions]." 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (Supp. III 1979). Section 304 allows citizens'
suits (but not, on its face, EPA suits) against any person who attempts to construct
a major source without a nonattainment or PSD permit, or who violates any term
of such a permit. Id. §§ 7604(a) (3), (f)(3). Although these provisions reach a
source that builds without a permit, or that violates a permit it has obtained, they
offer no mechanism to prevent a state from issuing a permit that violates the
purpose of the statute. The EPA could possibly have constructed an administrative
"veto" mechanism based on the language of §§ 113(a) (5) and 167, but it never
seriously explored that course.
103 Id. § 7410(a) (2) (D) ("permit program," "permit or equivalent program");
id. § 7502(b) ("The [nonattainment] plan provisions . . . shall . . . (6) require
permits . . . in accordance with section 7503 . . ... ); id. §7503 ("permit
program").
Although Part C of title I, concerning PSD, contains no parallel statement, it
explicitly provides for notice to the Administrator of any state action respecting a
state PSD permit, id. §7475(d)(1), and contains special provisions allowing the
Administrator to stop construction without a permit. Id. § 7477. These provisions
would be unnecessary if permits were part of the SIP, because all SIP changes
must automatically be transmitted to the EPA for approval, and comprehensive
authority to enforce SIPs is conferred by § 113. Id. § 7413.
104 Id. §§ 7413, 7420.
105 Id. § 7604.
10 6 See id. §7413(b) (injunction or civil penalty); id. §7413(c) (criminal
penalty); id. § 7420 (administratively assessed civil penalty).
1
0 7 See note 103 supra.
19811 1091
1092 UNIVERSIT OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 129:1059
program while omitting the individual permits themselves. Under
any general program, it is the individual permits, not the program
that authorizes them, that will carry the binding regulatory message.
The sum of those individual terms, not the general program, will
determine whether the permit program in the SIP (and thus the
SIP) is adequate to clean the air or preserve its cleanliness.
Indeed, the EPA could have adopted this logic to solve the two
immediate problems with permits. It could have stated that because
each permit, viewed analytically, should be part of the SIP, it would
have to be included in the SIP by processing through the double
key. 08 That would have removed any doubts about enforceability,
while the review opportunity would also have allowed the EPA to
disapprove those permits that did not meet minimum legal require-
ments. It is a testament to the unworkability of the double key
that, despite these advantages to the Agency, the EPA never seriously
considered extending it to all permits. Instead, it has approached
those issues by an unsatisfactory compromise.
First, it promulgated a regulation stating that "all permit con-
ditions or permit denials issued pursuant to approved or promul-
gated regulations for the review of new or modified . . . sources"
may be enforced as part of the SIP.109 The EPA has never ex-
plained, however, how these permits become part of the SIP for
enforcement purposes without going through the SIP approval
process laid down by the statute.
Beyond that legal question, this approach does nothing to cure
the present lack of EPA review authority. The Agency has thus
been willing to allow the construction of major new sources without
mandating approval of the new source regulatory requirements
through the double key. It has not been willing, however, to adopt
that approach where changes in the emissions requirements for
existing sources are concerned. Operating permits are often in-
cluded in SIPs, and if a state wishes to revise such an operating
permit, the full SIP approval process must be followed.1 0
There is little sense in having the procedures for such similar
transactions differ at all. But if there must be an illogical distinc-
tion, the present approach makes it in the least logical way. New
108 Because the statute defines a SIP as the sum of all state requirements that
the EPA has approved through the double key under the broad statutory tests,
this redefinition would be sufficient to include permits in the SIPs.
10940 C.F.R. §§52.02(d), .23 (1980).
11o This is explicitly set forth in the EPA's "bubble" policy. 44 Fed. Reg.
71,780, 71,782, 71,786 (1979). The EPA has now relaxed that requirement for
cases in which the permissible conditions for individual permits can be determined
by simply applying a mathematical formula. See 46 Fed. Reg. 20,554 (1981).
sources must be of considerable size before the statute requires
review, and by definition they always increase emissions. Changes
in operating permits, on the other hand, can include minor emis-
sions increases or even reductions as well as major increases. It
would therefore make more sense from a pollution control stand-
point to subject the former and not the latter to full SIP review.
The only justification-a poor one-for the current practice is that
requiring double-key approval for new sources would result in in-
tolerable regulatory delays in the commencement of construction,
while similar delays in changing requirements for existing sources
are more acceptable because new construction is not involved and
the cost is therefore likely to be less.
c. Permits and SIPs
Beyond the problems with the permit system itself, two other
difficulties arise in considering the system's relation to the SIPs.
First, permits to new sources will generally not be modified after
issuance, because they set the conditions under which construction
may proceed."" A source that must get a permit, however, may
also be subject to SIP provisions that the permit does not reflect.
Yet the statute provides no mechanism to coordinate permit terms
with applicable SIP provisions, even though the two are bound to
diverge over time, as the SIPs change while the permit does not.
The second problem is that the different treatment of SIPs and
permits defines a fundamental inconsistency in the statute. The
requirement for a double approval of SIPs has led to great pile-ups
of routine paper in EPA regional offices. At the same time, state
permit decisions involving major new sources, which are far more
important to national goals than are most of these SIP changes, go
totally unreviewed by the EPA.
III. A PERMIT-BASED CLEAN AIR AcT
Congress could greatly alleviate all of the problems discussed
above by using permits issued to individual sources, not SIPs, as
the major vehicles of regulation.
A. The Clean Water Act as a Model
The Clean Water Act, also administered by the EPA, rests on
a permit system that has proved quite workable in practice. Indeed,
llSee 42 U.S.C. §§7475, 7502(b)(6), 7503 (Supp. III 1979).
1981] CLEAN AIR ACT 1093
1094 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the EPA has largely conformed the permit programs by which the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 112 and the Safe Drinking
Water Act 13 will be implemented to the Clean Water Act model.,14
Under the Clean Water Act, every "point source" of water
pollution 115 must apply for and receive a permit.116 The permit
may be issued either by the EPA or by an approved state.117 To be
approved, a state must show that it has full authority under state
law to issue permits that satisfy federal requirements," s and that its
program for issuing permits will in fact meet basic federal stan-
dards. The Agency is entitled to object to or "veto" any state-issued
permit if it acts within a specified short period.119 If a state does
12 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795. See note 30 supra.
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1976).
314The Agency did this in its Consolidated Permit Regulations, which
integrate the permit requirements under each of these statutes. See 40 C.F.R.
§122-124 (1980).
315T he statute defines a "point source" as "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. I1 1979). A "pollutant" is defined as
"dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge,
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked
or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and
agriculture waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976).
Specific exclusions exempt from the sweep of these definitions irrigation return
flows, discharges of sewage from vessels, and certain discharges in connection with
oil or gas drilling. Id.
Finally, a "discharge" is, in part, "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source." Id. § 1362(12).
116The Clean Water Act provides: "Except as [sic] in compliance with this
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
(Supp. Il 1979). With one exception, the sections listed provide for specific
regulatory requirements that may apply to a discharge. Section 1342 mirrors the
list of specific provisions and makes the permit the vehicle for them by providing:
Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Adminis-
trator may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the
discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding
section 1311(a) of this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet
. .. all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,
1318 and 1343 of this title, or . .. such conditions as the Administrator
determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
Id. §1342(a)(1).
117 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
118 Id.
119 The Act requires each approved state to provide the EPA with copies of
each permit application and each permit it proposes to issue, unless the EPA
waives its right to receive them. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1) (1976). It further
provides that "[n]o permit shall issue ...if [EPA] within ninety days of the date
of transmittal of the proposed permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance
of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter."
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not correct whatever deficiencies the EPA has identified, the Agency
itself can issue a superseding permit. 20 All final permits, both
state and federal, are equally enforceable in federal court.121 Con-
versely, a source's permit specifies the sum total of requirements
that it must comply with under the Clean Water Act.122 Only in
special cases can permit conditions be changed before the term
expires. 123 To allow periodic reexamination and amendment as
new knowledge develops, Clean Water Act permits expire, and re-
quire renewal at intervals not exceeding five years. 24
As a mechanical matter, this entire scheme could be trans-
planted into the Clean Air Act without significant change. Each
source of air pollution would require an air pollution control per-
mit issued either by the EPA or an approved state. The permit
would contain all the Clean Air Act requirements governing that
source, would generally remain constant for a fixed term,125 and
would expire and be renewed at periodic intervals12o State permits
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (Supp. 1I 1979). The EPA must specify the deficiencies,
and, upon request, hold a public hearing on them. Id.
120 The Act provides that if a state does not satisfactorily revise a proposed
permit to which the EPA has objected within 30 days of any hearing on that
objection, or within 90 days of the objection if no hearing is held, the EPA may
issue the permit itself. Id. § 1342(d)(4).
12133 U.S.C. § 1319 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
122"Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed
compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 [the enforcement provisions of
the Clean Water Act], with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 . . .
except any standard imposed under section 1317 for a toxic pollutant injurious to
human health." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976).
123The EPA's Consolidated Permit Regulations provide a list of situations in
which this may be done. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.15 (1980).
' 2 4 The Clean Water Act requires all permits issued under an approved state
program to be "for fixed terms not exceeding five years," 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)
(B) (Supp. I 1979), and binds EPA permits to the same standards that govern
permits under an approved state program. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1976).
125The National Commission on Air Quality has endorsed an approach that
would achieve the same result by providing that, in general, control requirements
for individual sources could be changed only at ten-year intervals. NAT'L Com-
Mrss N, supra note 12, at 2.2-10-11.
126To provide an acceptable degree of control, the threshold emission levels
that make a source subject to the permit requirements might have to be dropped
significantly below the present levels. See note 94 supra.
Congress, by authorizing the issuance of "general permits," could avoid the pos-
sibility that such a broad permitting requirement would snare the EPA, the states,
and the regulated industries in a web of permits too numerous to handle. In effect,
these would be rules covering a number of small sources, probably in the same
geographical area, and subjecting them to common regulatory requirements. Yet
they would be more flexible than rules usually are, because a source that did not
wish to be bound by the generic provisions would potentially be able to apply for
and receive a permit containing requirements tailored to its own circumstances.
Judge Leventhal first suggested this approach to the EPA in a case under
the Clean Water Act, which requires all dischargers, regardless of size, to get
permits. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381
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would be subject to federal veto within a specified short period after
issuance, and the EPA could issue a superseding permit if the state
did not take necessary corrective actions. All permits would be
fully enforceable in federal court.
B. The Immediate Advantages of a Permits Approach
A permits approach would alleviate at least four of the current
systems procedural problems. Most immediately, the permits ap-
proach would replace, with a single intermediate position, both
the "double key" and the inability of the EPA to review permits.
No state permits would need affirmative EPA approval, and none
would be automatically exempt from review. Instead, state permits
would take effect automatically unless the EPA bestirred itself to dis-
approve them. Further, the statute could allow, as the Clean Water
Act does, 127 the EPA and a state to agree to waive review of certain
categories of permits. 12 8 This would further focus EPA attention on
cases that genuinely deserved it. Even without this refinement,
however, the abandonment of the "double key" would eliminate
the pointless delay of approving routine changes by dual state and
federal proceedings, and would relieve the EPA's regional offices
of a substantial volume of unproductive work.
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The EPA has since formally adopted it. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.59
(1980), promulgated at 45 Fed. Reg. 33,447 (1980). See also 44 Fed. Reg.
32,873-74, 32,916-17 (1979).
12733 U.S.C. §§1342(d)(3), (e) (Supp. I1 1979).
128 The combination of a general "veto" power with the authority to waive
review would allow the EPA to rely on quality control methods more sophisticated
and efficient than case-by-case review of each individual permit. For example, a
statistical approach based on sampling of a certain number of decisions, or intensive
audits by special review teams, could be relied on instead. See Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the
Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CoaNEI_ L. Rav. 772 (1974).
Despite the advantages, some problems involving federal-state relations would
still remain. For example, an EPA Region might informally let a state know that
a permit would be vetoed unless it contained certain terms. The state might then
respond by making the desired changes. The federal input would have been one
factor in the decision, and yet only state court review might be available. See
Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978); Comment, Jurisdiction to
Review Informal EPA Influence upon State Decisionmaking Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1814 (1979).
This problem, however, goes only to whether a litigant can always have its
desired forum for challenging agency action, which is hardly a topic of major
concern. In addition, exactly the same problem arises in the SIP area, and there
is every reason to believe that state agencies will have more cause to heed EPA
suggestions in that situation than under a permit-based scheme. To veto a permit
is a major step that a regional office probably would not undertake lightly, while
simply to be slow in processing a SIP revision, though much less visible, could be
almost as effective in putting pressure on a state.
Permits would also remedy the current uncertainty created by
the diversity of requirements imposed on sources by the Act. In-
deed, the permit itself would serve as the vehicle to coordinate
these requirements because it would have to contain all of
them.12 9 In addition, any confusion in the underlying SIPs would
become somewhat less important to sources, because all obligations
under the Act would be set out exclusively in the permits. Finally,
the permits approach would remove questions about SIP-permit
conflicts, because the permit would include all the regulatory pro-
visions applicable to a source. Likewise, the approach would resolve
questions about the enforceability of permits.
C. The Broader Advantages of a Permits Approach
In addition to curing the predominantly mechanical defects
discussed above, a permit-based Clean Air Act would accommodate
new knowledge, provide a foundation for a market-based approach,
and handle federal-state relations and relations between EPA statutes
more effectively than does the existing system. The following
section examines the treatment of new knowledge under a permit
system. It is first necessary, however, to examine how actual pollu-
tion controls could be established in such a system.
1. A Permit System and New Knowledge
a. Basing an Ambient Statute on Permits
Any regulatory system that relies upon individual permits faces
two related requirements. First, some mechanism must be created
for establishing the specific control provisions contained in par-
ticular permits. Second, the terms of individual permits must be
bound together into a common and unified regulatory scheme.
Both of these needs arise with particular intensity in an environ-
129 Under the Act at present, control requirements can potentially be based on
a variety of ambient or technology-based calculations. Because the regulatory
requirements for a planit thus can have widely differing origins, a permit would
perform the very useful task of summarizing and synthesizing what those require-
ments mean in the concrete circumstances of an individual source. The National
Commission on Air Quality has identified as a problem the present lack of such a
coordinating vehicle. NAT'L CommSssioNe, supra note 12, at 2.1-66, 3.8-2.
In addition, this approach would be particularly useful for dealing with the
narrowly focussed requirements listed in note 63 supra. Each of these provides for
either a permit or a "quasi-permit"-a source-specific requirement that imposes
continuing obligations. They would therefore fit more cleanly into a permit-based
Clean Air Act than they do into the present structure. At present, decisions under
these provisions, like SIP decisions, may be made at any time. A permit-based
Act could greatly simplify matters by providing that such decisions generally be
made only at the time of issuance or renewal of a source's permit.
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mental statute based primarily upon ambient, rather than tech-
nological, standards.
Under a technology-based scheme, permit issuance proceedings
can be used to determine the appropriate technology for particular
sources and require its installation there. Because questions about
what technology is available at what cost may look similar and have
similar answers from plant to plant within an industry, addressing
each permit in a separate proceeding has definite costs. It requires
duplication of effort to the extent that the sources involved are
similar. If different standards result, the source subject to the
stricter standard can argue that it has been treated unfairly. Even
given these problems, however, the control scheme would work
after a fashion.
Under an ambient approach, by contrast, it is not always pos-
sible to set requirements source by source in unrelated, individual
proceedings. The questions that recur among permit proceedings
in an ambient system are likely to be not just similar-as with tech-
nology-based standards-but the same. The issuing agency must,
for each permit proceeding, determine what the emission and pol-
lution characteristics of a region are and what pattern of controls
will bring the region to attainment, or prevent significant deteriora-
tion. Given this background, it follows that controlling sources
to meet ambient requirements presents a problem that is "poly-
centric" in the classic sense. That is, the control requirements for
source A may vary depending on the requirements set for sources
B, C, D, and so forth.130 Thus, it is impossible to grant a permit
to A without considering how to regulate the others.
One response to these problems could be simply to abandon
the ambient approach. That, however, would also abandon much
hope for efficient environmental regulation.1 1 The key task, there-
fore, is to find a way to address the problems that recur from permit
to permit, or that link individual permit decisions together, under
an ambient scheme. For both types of problems, the solution in
principle is well established in administrative law. The control
agency should issue rules, or set general principles, specifying how
it will decide common or interlocking questions. Judges and pro-
130 L. FULLER, ThE MoRALrrv oF LAw 170-77 (rev. ed. 1969); Boyer, Alter-
natives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific,
Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MicH. L. Rsv. 111, 117 (1972) ("Perhaps the
clearest example of problems that seem 'polycentric' can be found in the field of
environmental protection."); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HAnv. L. REv. 353, 394-405 (1978).
13 1 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
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Lessors have urged this course for more than a generation on estab-
lished agencies that, like the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Federal Communications Commission, decide many related
cases. 132 There is no reason not to transpose it to the relatively
new field of environmental law.
More concretely, a state or the EPA would issue a general rule
that established the mechanisms needed to make ambient calcula-
tions for an area. The rule would specify the applicable air quality
readings, the inventory of sources, the meteorological readings, and
the model. These determinations would generally bind individual
permit proceedings, though some departures might be allowed in
particular cases. The agency would update the general rule as new
knowledge developed, but the changes would have prospective
effect only. Except in unusual cases, 133 the agency would not re-
flect the rule changes in individual permits until they expired and
were reissued at the end of their terms.
This approach would avoid duplication or inconsistency in the
factual or analytical portions of individual proceedings. It would
not, however, deal with the more difficult policy problem raised if
any one of several sources could be controlled to attain a given
ambient level, and the agency had to choose among these different
control patterns. Two solutions to this problem are possible. First,
and simplest, any conflicts could be directly addressed in a generic
decision, either at the rulemaking stage if they surfaced there, or
else in a permit proceeding to which all potentially affected sources
were parties. This type of permit proceeding would be similar to a
"comparative" hearing to award a TV or radio license or an airline
route.
A comparative hearing approach, however, would seldom be
the best solution. Comparative proceedings represent an effort to
confront the complexities of a decision head on, without the pre-
liminary use of simplifying assumptions. That effort has his-
torically proved unwieldly and inefficient. 34  These characteristics
would probably persist even if adjudicatory hearings were not
13 2 The classic statement is H. FIENDLY, TE FEDERAL ADmmSTRATrVE
AGENCES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDAmDS (1962).
13
3 See note 123 supra & accompanying text.
134 See S. BmYE & R. STEwART, AxmNnTRrx LA, AND REGULATORY
POLICY 373, 572 (1979); H. FmENDLY, supra note 132, at 55-56, 70-73 (FCC),
91, 97-98 (CAB); SENATE ComMrrrEz ON THE JUDoicimY, STAFF OF SuBcomb=TE
ON ADMINSTRATrE PRACTICES AND PROCEDUREs, REPORT ON CAB PRACncEs AND
PRocEDEs, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEss. (1975); Anthony, Towards Simplicity and
Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. R v. 1,
3-5, 39, 47-55, 109-10 (1971).
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used.18 5 Furthermore, the nature of the problem of air pollution
control neither allows nor demands the absolute precision that com-
parative hearings might appear to offer. Given the technical un-
certainties that becloud the area, the actual ambient effect of any
given emissions allocation is bound to be subject to a substantial
margin of error. In addition, the potential harms caused by air
pollution appear to vary smoothly rather than discontinuously with
exposure levels. 13 6 That in turn suggests that the costs of small
mistakes in allocating emissions among sources would also be small.
All of these difficulties of a permits system based on compara-
tive hearings could be alleviated by a second type of approach which
would rely on broad rules of decision for allocating controls among
several eligible sources. The most economically efficient variation
of this approach would be to determine the total amount of emis-
sions that could be tolerated, and then auction an equal number of
emission "rights" off to the highest bidders.137 If that is not accept-
able, a simple rule stating that no less (and, perhaps, no more) of the
necessary reductions could be assigned to any one source would be
sufficient. That rule would link together individual proceedings;
more particularly, it would contain the most troublesome potential
problem raised by issuing linked permits over time. The danger
is that an agency might largely exempt from controls the first
sources to receive permits by asserting that later sources would be
tightly regulated, and then renege when the time arrived to issue
those later permits. Although this test would be a rough one,
any resulting inefficiencies could be reduced by allowing the
sources to later trade the allowable emissions among themselves,
as described earlier. The important point, no matter which of these
variations is adopted, is that a framework of broad rules should be
135 Commentators have often identified as a major problem the use of trial-type
hearings for making permit decisions that rest on policy choices or the assessment
of complex facts and that do not involve judgments of wrongdoing. See STAFF OF
SENATE CoM r-mm ON GOVERNmENTAL AFFAmS, STUDy ON FEDERAL REGULATION;
DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978).
Less formal types of procedures have been developed that can handle these ques-
tions and still be fair to all concerned. Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of
Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 VA. L. REv. 991 (1978). Avoiding trial-type
hearings, however, would not address the need to pull individual decisions into a
coherent scheme. See H. FImNDLY, supra note 132, at 174, remarking:
Of the scores of administrative adjudications we have considered, I do not
recall one that has raised an issue as to . . . any of the . . . important
adjective rights that are the staples of the usual administrative law course.
All the formalities have been faithfully pursued-the book has been duly
kissed; the trouble has been with the product.
136 H. LANDSBERG, supra note 12, at 361, 364, 368, 375.
137 See text preceding note 23 supra.
formulated to guide and link together individual permit proceed-
ings.
b. A Permit System and New Knowledge
Establishing a set of general rules to guide individual permit
decisions would narrow the differences between a permit system and
the present statute's structure. Certain rules-those that established
the air quality baseline, the inventory, the model, and the permit-
ting strategies-would mirror much of what SIPs now contain.
Other general rules, as at present, might take the form of national
regulations. 13 Despite these similarities, the immediate mechanical
virtues of a shift to permits would be preserved to the extent that
permits alone contained federally enforceable regulatory provisions
that actually bound individual sources, with general rules simply
providing the backdrop.
More fundamentally, a statute that combined general rules for
issuing permits with individual permits containing control require-
ments would handle new knowledge better than the present statute,
both on a day-to-day level and in overall design. On the day-to-day
level, the system's distinctive feature would be that the general
rules for issuing permits could change at any time, while the in-
dividual permits themselves would seldom change before they ex-
pired and were reissued at the end of their terms.
The present Act provides no means of scheduling changes in a
SIP, and forces any changes to take effect in time to meet the short
statutory deadlines.13 9  The result has been a resistance to new
knowledge because of the disruption and uncertainty that such
knowledge generates. By providing a fixed period, during which
permits would generally not change, and a predictable time at
which they would be reexamined, a permit system would be
"buffered" against the effects of new knowledge. That knowledge
would enter the system only at definite times and in definite pro-
ceedings.140 Moreover, at the specified times for considering permit
13 8 See note 36 supra.
139 See notes 43 & 51 supra and text accompanying note 70 supra.
14 0 Moreover, an agency's use of a permits system to affirmatively encourage
new knowledge could go beyond the basic and largely automatic effects detailed
above. If the agency were to leave certain questions open for resolution in indi-
vidual permit proceedings, those proceedings would then develop information useful
for updating the general rule. The burden of proof could be appropriately shifted
in such cases to reduce the chances that individual decisions would disrupt the
overall scheme.
According to judge Leventhal, "[o]n the issue of burden of proof, the standard
adopted must take into account the nature and consequences of the risk of error."
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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changes, the elimination of the double key would make them easier
to accomplish.
These characteristics of a permit system reflect its more funda-
mental virtue: it corresponds more closely to our understanding of
the kind of problem that air pollution is than does the existing
system. The present SIP system is based on a short-term effort to
achieve standards. It assumes that we know what is necessary, that
what remains is to act, and that the need to act is urgent. This is
the implicit message behind the directive that all SIPs be submitted
at one time, that all necessary calculations and modelling be made
then, that these calculations and modelling be speedily approved or
disapproved, and speedily corrected where necessary, and that com-
pliance follow promptly. It is also the implicit message behind the
complete lack of any mechanism for handling change in an orderly
manner.
This approach is, of course, not even intellectually appropriate
where the air is already clean and regulation seeks to preserve its
quality. Nor does it fit areas where efforts to attain standards have
been successful, and keeping the air clean has become the issue.
Even where the standards have not been met, the constant develop-
ment of new knowledge casts considerable doubt on both the merits
and workability of this system.
A permit approach would impose a different philosophy on the
system. The universe of permits could be set to expire and be re-
newed at a relatively constant rate. Any necessary changes could
be introduced into the regulatory system permit by permit over an
entire renewal cycle, rather than being imposed simultaneously
upon all sources, as is at least theoretically the case under the SIP
system. As a necessary consequence, the artificial deadlines in the
current law would be deemphasized in favor of a continual, gradual
nudging of the regulatory system toward better results over time.' 41
The permit-based approach, by allowing different permits with
different expiration dates to contain somewhat different provisions,
accepts and makes manageable the inability to do everything at once
that is inherent in any complex regulatory scheme. It is the natural
Similarly, the somewhat conflicting aims of running a uniform and efficient regu-
latory scheme and developing useful new information in case-by-case proceedings
could be roughly reconciled by allowing individual case exemptions from a general
rule, but only by meeting a significant burden of proof See Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1013-15 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., sup-
plemental opinion), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 509, 535-36 (1974).
141 The National Commission on Air Quality has recommended not just de-
emphasizing, but eliminating, the present mandatory attainment deadlines. NAT'L
CommissioN, supra note 12, at 2.2-10.
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procedural vehicle by which to shift the Act from an emphasis on
short-run acute effects to an effort of long-term maintenance and
gradual improvement.
2. Permits and Economic Efficiency
A permits approach is tightly linked to efforts to create a more
economically efficient pollution control system. As we have seen,
"trading" pollution reductions among sources in effect requires the
type of source-specific, enforceable emission controls that a permit,
or its functional equivalent, provides. 142  Absent such controls a
market system would likely prove unenforceable. In addition, the
increased stability and predictability accompanying regulatory re-
quirements in a fixed-term system would encourage trading. The
fixed permit term would allow sources to invest in creating emission
reductions, or to purchase them, with greater assurance than at
present that regulatory changes would not diminish the value of
that asset.
The frequent amendments to source-specific control require-
ments that would accompany a "pollution rights" system might
initially seem difficult to reconcile with the stability and certainty
that a permit system is designed to provide. There is a sharp dis-
tinction, however, between this type of regulatory change and the
type of change frequently mandated under the present law. Changes
associated with "pollution rights" are made at the request of the
regulated source to meet existing requirements in a more efficient
way. These should be freely allowed. On the other hand, changes
based on new knowledge or on new policy choices generally signal
a regulatory change of course. These should generally be made
only when permits expire. By treating different types of regula-
tory changes differently, a permit system could efficiently process
trading while avoiding the evils of uncertainty and unpredictability.
3. Realizing the Full Benefits of a Market System
The Clean Air Act, as presently administered, imposes one
substantial obstacle to broad reliance on a market system. For
several important pollutants,143 the current regulatory approach
142 See text following note 73 supra.
143The most elaborate modelling requirements concern sulfur oxide and
particulates. See 45 Fed. Reg. 77,459, 77,461 nn.6 & 7 (1980) (stating the EPA
policy of requiring detailed site-specific modelling to determine the proper control
levels for sulfur oxide and particulates, but not requiring detailed modelling for
photochemical oxidants). See also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572
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relies heavily on detailed modelling and monitoring, not just of
emissions in a region, but of the local impact of individual sources.
The result can be to establish a fairly rigid system of source-specific
emissions limitations, one that demands controls on a given source
regardless of relative cost, because only controls on that source will
be assured of removing measured or projected violations in a par-
ticular local area.
144
To the extent that the scientific and engineering design of the
system itself thus precisely specifies the emission limits for each
individual source, the efficiency benefits of reallocating those limits
through the market become unattainable. Such a sacrifice of effi-
ciency might be justified if detailed source-by-source modelling had
unique advantages in preventing the harms that the Act seeks to
control. Experience so far, however, seems to cast doubt on any
such advantages.
Detailed modelling and monitoring of individual pollution
sources has been difficult and expensive to apply in practice.245 The
results obtained inevitably contain a substantial margin of uncer-
tainty, and there is usually room for considerable doubt whether
the health or welfare differences between two readings in roughly
the same area are in fact significant. As a result, questions have
been raised as to whether, even under the current control scheme,
the statute may not unduly rely on modelling and monitoring.
The doubts about modelling multiply where measures to re-
duce the long-range impact of air pollution are at issue. It is
presently impossible to accurately model areas beyond the size of a
small city, even when only physical dispersion is at issue. Further-
more, many of the long-range effects of pollution are thought to
result from the chemical transformation over time of pollutants in
the atmosphere, thus introducing more complexity into modelling
efforts. Finally, since both the causes and effects of long-range
pollution cover wide regions and act on a large scale, detailed model-
ling of individual sources may always be of limited value in under-
standing or dealing with the problem. 46
F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978); MoDELLING GUIDELiNES, supra note 14, at 18-24
(recommending four classes of models for sulfur oxides and particulates, one each
for carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide, and none for photochemical oxidants).
144 If the model is complex and site-specific, sources will not be able to deter-
mine in advance whether their trades will be acceptable under the regulatory
scheme. Any complex model involves room for disagreement and for the possibility
that the regulatory agency simply may not accept the source's conclusions. This is
much less likely where a simple mathematical reallocation of emissions is concerned.
145 See NAT-'L COMMIssION, supra note 12, at 3.5-36-37.
146 See H. LANSBERc, supra note 12, at 340, 343, 403-04. It should still be
possible, however, to use "regional" models to describe the causes and distribution
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These considerations suggest that an approach that looks more
toward general reduction of pollutants that have long-range effects
within a broad area is likely to be at least as effective as a system
that relies on detailed assessment of individual sources. A regulation
adopted under such an approach might state, for example, that "By
the year 19-, sulfur oxides emissions in the X region shall not ex-
ceed Y million tons." 147 This type of general ambient approach
could be readily adapted to a market-based regulatory system. At
the outset, the control agency under such a system would have to
allocate the allowed regional emissions among sources.148 Subse-
quently, the system would have to provide some mechanism for
transferring these "allowable emissions" among sources as sources
expanded or closed down, or switched fuels, or improved their con-
trols. The policy arguments for doing this through an "emission
rights" approach under a permits system are even stronger than
those for using such an approach under our current system. A
scheme of general pollution reduction would almost certainly cover
a far larger area and include more sources than current SIPs do.
Increasing the number of sources covered would increase the poten-
tial for efficiency gains through a market approach by increasing the
number of participants in that market.
At the same time, the switch to a policy concerned with total
emissions, rather than site-specific impacts, would remove much of
the need for detailed examination of individual transactions. The
regulatory agency would only have to be satisfied that total emis-
sions of all regulated sources would stay below the limits, and it
would not focus on the exact impacts at each particular source.
This limiting of the review standards would widen the class of per-
missible trades and would make it easier to determine in advance
which trades qualified. That in turn would increase the potential
for efficiency gains through trading while smoothing the mechanical
workings of the statute.
even of these pollutants. These models would cover a broader area, and their
inputs and outputs would be more aggregated than is the case for a source-by-
source model. See NATI Conaussox, supra note 12, at 3.9-15-17.
147This approach would not compel abandoning the ambient foundations of
the statute. First, the required reductions should not be set by Congress, but by
the control agency in a general rulemaking proceeding based on analysis of the
environmental effects of the pollutants involved. Second, the rule could be given a
more elaborate form where necessary to deal with more refined issues. For
example, the rule might only cover "plumes" of emissions that rose to a certain
height and thus became subject to broad dispersion. Regional models such as those
discussed in the previous note could be used to help derive such conditions.
148The most economically efficient way to do this would be an auction. See
text above note 23 supra.
19811
1106 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
4. Coordination with States and with Other EPA Statutes
a. Coordination with States
By far the most substantial contribution that a permit system
would bring to state-federal relations would be the elimination of
the double key.149 Beyond that, there is some reason to hope that
a permit-based system would remove some of the legal complexities
that attend the present statute.
The building blocks of the proposed system-the permits-
would, procedurally, either be entirely state or entirely federal.
Accordingly, the status of a state-issued permit in litigation would
be easy to determine. If the state courts overturned it, federal
law would provide no grounds for denying effect to that decision.
That is not the case under the existing SIP framework. 5 0 Ac-
cordingly, by this change the EPA would concede a line of defense
that is at present the subject of at least some dispute. For several
reasons, however, this change probably would not make the con-
trol system as a whole more vulnerable to legal challenge or to
other changes in state law.
Most obviously, the present system essentially produces confu-
sion, rather than a genuine deterrent to state law changes. In ad-
dition, under the proposed approach challenges to permits would
proceed case by case. The overturning of controls in one case
would affect only the emitter challenging the permit conditions in
that case. The legal action would not affect other plants, even in
similar circumstances, that might have accepted their permits.151
A system that produced remands limited to single sources would
allow the state to respond quickly, at least to some of them, or
149 See notes 64-70 supra & accompanying text.
15o See text above note 81 supra.
151 The EPA has adopted this approach under the Clean Water Act, success-
fully arguing that certain questions arising under rules for calculating permit condi-
tions were not ripe for judicial review until they were applied in individual permit
proceedings. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. EPA, 580 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Cf. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 521, 528 (3d Cir. 1976) (decision
on jurisdictional grounds, but dicta suggest ripeness considerations).
Similarly, some courts deciding Clean Air Act cases have cited the possibility
of general disruption in refusing to pass on technical issues specific to one source
when reviewing EPA approval of a complete state SIP, and have suggested that such
claims should instead be heard in the source-specific context of an enforcement pro-
ceeding. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975).
In two other cases, the court, in remanding an EPA action, confined the relief
granted to the specific sources petitioning, even though the issue raised and decided
was generally applicable. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir.
1979); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1, 10 (3d Cir. 1973). Cf. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing the
small percentage of affected sources challenging a rule as a reason for upholding it).
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would allow the EPA to issue a superseding permit if it did not.
The present generic approach, by contrast, can leave all affected
sources uncontrolled for years while the remand continues. Build-
ing the regulatory system around control requirements fixed for a
permit term would discourage efforts by polluters to get admin-
istrative or legislative relief during that term. Under the SIP
approach, as we have seen,152 that relief is potentially available at
any time.
None of these aspects of a permits system would change the
status of generic rules for issuing permits. If affirmative EPA ap-
proval were required there, questions similar to those we face at
present could persist. Once again, however, the fixed term would
shield individual permits until they expired. That would cushion
the impact of rule changes on the regulatory system. Furthermore,
these general rules would contain very few control requirements;
rather, they would contain data, analytical approaches, and strate-
gies. That lack of immediate bite might well reduce the profit-
ability, and perhaps the probability, of legal challenge.
Under a permit-based system, a state could make regulatory
decisions at one of two stages: in making the general rule for
issuing permits, or in issuing the permits themselves. That would
provide two additional ways to cushion the system from legal
challenge.
First, thorny questions that concerned only one or a few sources
could be dropped from the general rule and addressed in individual
permit proceedings. Once isolated there, no decision about them
would affect either the general rule or the other permits. Often
this reduction in risk might be well worth the efficiency loss result-
ing from the shift from generic to case-by-case decisions.
1 3
Second, the statute could provide some means for making
decisions on individual permits in a "second-best" way, even if the
general rule for issuing those permits had been overturned. For ex-
ample, if an area could not establish an ambient rule for issuing
permits, it might be empowered to issue permits based either on
technology-based standards or on some set standard for cutting
back emission levels. A similar approach, though under a less
15 2 See notes 58-63 supra & accompanying text.
' 5 3 The EPA has successfully asserted a right to set control standards for indi-
vidual dischargers on a case-by-case basis in individual Clean Water Act permit
proceedings where the generic rules for determining those controls have not yet
been issued or where the rules have been judicially disapproved. See Clean Water
Act §402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976); United States Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822, 844 (7th Cir. 1977).
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demanding statutory framework, has worked well under the Clean
Water Act.154 Such a safety net, at a minimum, could protect
against the unconsidered loosening of controls. That in turn, by
reducing the likelihood that future pollution levels would exceed
current ones, would support the broader decision to shift the
Clean Air Act to a generally more gradual approach.
b. Consistency with Other EPA Statutes
Each of the other major EPA pollution control statutes rests
on fixed-term permits, issued and reissued by states at fixed intervals
and subject to EPA veto within a definite short time. On a pro-
cedural level, then, coordination with these other statutes calls for
making the Clean Air Act a permitting statute also. The different
laws could be coordinated in practice by the simple expedient of
issuing and reissuing the permits simultaneously. I 5
This would be more than a bureaucratic convenience. Such
coordinated issuing of permits could provide a forum for discover-
ing conflicting EPA requirements and setting priorities among con-
trol tasks. If the air pollution and water pollution requirements
were inconsistent, a consolidated permit hearing would be the place
to find out. If a great deal more air pollution control could be
obtained by easing up a little bit on water pollution control (or
vice versa), a consolidated proceeding could allow the regulatory
154 The Clean Water Act's permit requirements are discussed at text accom-
panying notes 115-24 supra. In other environmental contexts, the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires each facility for the "treatment,
storage or disposal of hazardous waste" to obtain a permit from the EPA or an
approved state, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6925, 6926 (1976); the Safe Drinking Water Act
requires regulation, by rule or permit, of any underground injection of a "fluid,"
42 U.S.C. §§ 1421(b)(1)(B), (d)(1) (Supp. 111 1979), and the Ocean Dumping
Act prohibits any dumping of material into ocean waters without a permit from the
EPA (or, in some circumstances, the Corps of Engineers), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1402-
1405 (1976). In addition, the Corps of Engineers' program for regulating dredged
or fill materials also operates by permit. The EPA has substantial authority over
the decisions made in this program, and in the future the program will be
increasingly taken over by approved states, subject to EPA review, just like the
Clean Water Act or RCRA programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. III 1979).
The EPA has issued detailed Consolidated Permit Regulations, meshing to a
large degree the regulatory requirements through which the Clean Water Act,
RCRA, underground injection control, and "404" permit programs will be operated
in practice. See note 114 supra.
155 The EPA's Consolidated Permit Regulations allow this for the permits that
they cover. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,377, 33,407 (1980); 40 C.F.R. § 122.9(e) (1980).
Whenever permits are being issued at roughly the same time, either because
the applicant is a new source and must obtain its permits all at once, or because
the previous permits were set to expire together, the Consolidated Permit Regu-
lations allow (but do not require) common regulatory proceedings to be held in
connection with the issuance or reissuance of all those permits. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.4 (1980).
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agencies to discover that and act accordingly. In short, the process
of laying out these different factors, and balancing them against
each other, would contribute in a small way to a general shift in
perspective for environmental regulation similar to the one I advo-
cate for the Glean Air Act.
CONCLUSION
Any national air pollution control effort will necessarily be
complicated, and in at least some ways it must grow more compli-
cated over time. The complexities of the SIP approach under the
Clean Air Act, however, are based on a misunderstanding of the
problem, and should be replaced. They hamper the introduction
of new knowledge into the system, discourage economic efficiency,
and lead to conflict both between states and the EPA and between
the Clean Air Act and other EPA statutes.
Fixed-term permits, by contrast, would "buffer" the incorpora-
tion of new knowledge, and so encourage it, would provide a vehicle
suited to implement a market-based approach, and should work
smoothly both across the state-federal boundary and with other
EPA statutes. In short, if the Clean Air Act is to authorize a regu-
latory program that can change smoothly, slowly, and continuously
over time as new knowledge arises, rather than one that requires a
series of sudden efforts, the use of permits is the ideal approach.
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